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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property (IP) law stifles critical research on software security
vulnerabilities, placing computer users at risk. Researchers who discover
flaws often face IP-based legal threats if they reveal findings to anyone other
than the software vendor. This Article argues that the interplay between law
and vulnerability data challenges existing scholarship on how intellectual
property law should regulate information about improvements on protected
works, and suggests weakening, not enhancing, IP protections where
infringement is difficult to detect, lucrative, and creates significant negative
externalities. It proposes a set of three reforms—“patches,” in software
terms—to protect security research. Legal reform would create immunity from
civil IP liability for researchers who follow “responsible disclosure” rules.
Linguistic reform would seek to make the term hacker less threatening either
by recapturing the term’s original meaning, or abandoning it. Finally,
structural reform would ameliorate failures in the market for software
vulnerability data by having a trusted third party act as a voluntary
clearinghouse. The Article concludes by describing other areas, such as
physical security, where it may be useful to reform how law coordinates IP
improvements.
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INTRODUCTION: != BULLETPROOF1
Mike Lynn had done the impossible. He had found a way to crack open the
operating system on Cisco internet routers, causing them to run his code.2
Routers were Cisco’s most important product—and the backbone of much of
the internet—precisely because they had been legendarily immune to such
attacks.3 Lynn, though, had discovered their Achilles’ heel. The routers’
vulnerability placed a wide swath of internet infrastructure at risk.
Lynn, an experienced security researcher with the firm Internet Security
Systems (ISS), followed the protocol of “white hat” hackers, who probe for
computer software and hardware flaws with the goal of discovering, not
exploiting, them.4 He reported his findings to Cisco, which dutifully issued a
patch to correct the bug.5 But Cisco—concerned with damaging the invincible
image of its products—refused to draw particular attention to the patch, or to
press customers to implement it.6 Lynn, worried by Cisco’s decision not to
publicize the fix, prepared to give a presentation at the Black Hat hacker
conference in Las Vegas that would detail the basic concepts of the bug, but
would withhold information about how to exploit it.7
Cisco objected, fervently. Employing a range of legal theories from
intellectual property law, the company convinced a federal judge to issue a
restraining order preventing Lynn from giving his presentation.8 The company
also forced conference organizers to rip the printed version of Lynn’s slides

1 In programming languages, != means “not equal to.”
See Built-In Types—Python v2.7.1
Documentation, PYTHON STANDARD LIBR. § 5.3 tbl., http://docs.python.org/library/stdtypes.html#comparisons
(last updated May 13, 2011).
2 Kim Zetter, Router Flaw Is a Ticking Bomb, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.wired.com/politics/
security/news/2005/08/68365.
3 Robert Lemos, Cisco, ISS File Suit Against Rogue Researcher, SECURITYFOCUS (July 27, 2005), http://
www.securityfocus.com/news/11259.
4 By convention, black hat hackers discover bugs for financial gain or malicious reasons, and gray hat
hackers behave either as white hats or black hats, depending on the circumstances. The tripartite division,
borrowed from movie Westerns, corresponds roughly to good actors (white hats), bad ones (black hats), and
those whose orientation varies (gray hats). See THOMAS WILHELM, PROFESSIONAL PENETRATION TESTING:
CREATING AND OPERATING A FORMAL HACKING LAB 13–18 (2009).
5 Robert McMillan, Black Hat: ISS Researcher Quits Job to Detail Cisco Flaws, INFOWORLD (July 27,
2005), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/black-hat-iss-researcher-quits-job-detail-cisco-flaws-088.
6 See Zetter, supra note 2.
7 Jennifer Granick, An Insider’s View of ‘Ciscogate,’ WIRED (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.wired.com/
science/discoveries/news/2005/08/68435.
8 Id.
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out of the conference materials, and to turn over CDs containing a copy of his
slideshow.9
This Article argues that conflicts such as the one between Lynn and Cisco
are both increasingly common and socially harmful. Intellectual property (IP)
law stifles the dissemination of critical research on software security
vulnerabilities. We argue that IP law’s incentive effects are superfluous for
these bugs, as security research is an exemplar of “peer production” as
conceptualized by Yochai Benkler,10 Eric von Hippel,11 and Eric S.
Raymond.12 Researchers hunt bugs for a variety of reasons: intellectual
curiosity, ideology, reputation, and occasionally remuneration.
For
vulnerability research, IP law plays a suppressive rather than a generative
function—it blocks or limits whether, and how, hackers share their findings.13
The suppressive effect is heightened by the fact that researchers can rarely, if
ever, obtain IP law protection for their findings or insights. We argue that,
much as researchers have hacked software to make it behave unexpectedly and
thereby serve their purposes, software vendors have hacked IP law, using it for
ends unrelated to its original purpose.
Critically, IP law—like the software it protects—malfunctions here. It
enables software firms to suppress information about flaws. It presses
researchers to avoid legal risks from public disclosure and to gain financially
by offering their findings on the black market rather than through legitimate
channels. Software-vulnerability research challenges standard intellectual
property scholarship on the regulation of information about improving a
protected work or invention. Under current doctrine, someone who possesses
information about how to improve a work or invention protected by IP has
three options: bargain with the IP owner, seek an improvement patent, or
infringe. Contemporary scholarship typically focuses on tuning patent and
copyright law to generate optimal incentives and to coordinate improvements.
Mark A. Lemley argues that it is unnecessary for inventors to capture the full
9 Bruce Schneier, Cisco Harasses Security Researcher, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 29, 2005, 4:35
AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/cisco_harasses.html.
10 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375
(2002).
11 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 93–97 (2005) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL,
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION]; ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 25–26 (1988) [hereinafter
VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION].
12 ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 49–53 (Tim O’Reilly ed., rev. ed. 2001).
13 See generally Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006)
(describing how the internet’s architecture empowers users to generate innovation).
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social value of their advances, and that patent law should not set this
internalization as a goal.14 Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson analyze
the incentive effects of various standards for setting the scope of a patent,15 as
does Edmund W. Kitch.16 William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner
justify control over improvement information by IP owners as useful in
reducing transaction costs.17 Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg
worry about the problem of holdout costs when multiple parties must bargain
over improvements.18 Paul Goldstein assesses how copyright’s derivative
works doctrine—particularly indifferent to economics—has created adverse
effects on incentives to invest in copyrighted works.19 Current scholarly
wisdom thus presses toward conferring control over improvement information
to IP owners.
This Article, in contrast, identifies software security research as a
counterexample, where IP owners’ strong controls over improvement
information are harmful. Security bugs are problematic for three reasons:
infringement is (1) difficult to detect, (2) socially harmful due to negative
externalities, and (3) lucrative. We argue that IP law should be alert to similar
situations and that, counterintuitively, such circumstances require a diminution,
not an increase, in IP protections. The Article goes on to suggest additional
areas where the channeling effect of legal rules over improvement information
may be critically important.
This Article is also the first to propose a set of reforms—“patches,” in
software terms—to protect socially valuable security research, guide behavior
of those searching for vulnerabilities, and channel dissemination of
vulnerability data toward legitimate consumers. Other legal scholarship treats
intellectual property law as a lost cause. Jennifer Stisa Granick argues
compellingly against restrictions on vulnerability disclosures, but focuses on IP

14

Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990).
16 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
17 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 110–11 (2003).
18 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 640–41, 667–77 (1998); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998).
19 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
209 (1983).
15
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law solely as a barrier.20 Peter P. Swire, in assessing incentives for
vulnerability disclosure, notes law’s role as a barrier to a firm’s competitors in
creating equivalent software.21 Susan W. Brenner evaluates the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a form of information censorship.22
Bruce H. Kobayashi argues for more extensive intellectual property protection
to drive adoption of cybersecurity.23
Computer scientists are even more pessimistic. Stephen Bono, Aviel
Rubin, Adam Stubblefield, and Matthew Green refer to “security through
legality” as a “hopelessly flawed methodology.”24 Tom Cross views efforts to
limit hackers’ investigations as embracing the view that “ignorance makes you
safer.”25 And Paul Graham, who invented Bayesian spam filtering, views
copyright as “a threat to the intellectual freedom [hackers] need to do their
job,” which is to reduce the creation and impact of poorly written software
code.26
In contrast, this Article seeks to adapt IP law, rather than to abandon it as a
tool. It proposes three methods of reform to accomplish this. First, we argue
that the security research community should try to shift the largely negative,
threatening set of connotations associated with the term hacker. If bug hunters
cannot reclaim the word’s original meaning, they should cede it and employ an
alternative.
Second, a voluntary intermediary—a vulnerability clearinghouse—should
be established to coordinate contact between vendors and researchers, to
document identified bugs, and to track their evolution. The clearinghouse can
address key structural flaws in the market for vulnerability information that
impede legitimate transactions and push researchers to sell information
illicitly.

20 Jennifer Stisa Granick, The Price of Restricting Vulnerability Publications, INT’L J. COMM. L. &
POL’Y, Spring 2005, at 1, http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp_web-doc_10-cy-2004.pdf.
21 Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source,
Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1366 (2006).
22 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be
Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 348–56 (2003).
23 Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of
Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 261 (2006).
24 Stephen Bono et al., Security Through Legality, COMM. ACM, June 2006, at 41, 42.
25 Tom Cross, Academic Freedom and the Hacker Ethic, COMM. ACM, June 2006, at 37, 39.
26 PAUL GRAHAM, HACKERS & PAINTERS 51 (2004).
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Finally, the Article proposes regulating researcher behavior in exchange for
a shield from IP law. If hackers follow a prescribed course of conduct during
their investigations—roughly tracking the “responsible disclosure” model used
in the security community—they should be granted immunity from civil27
intellectual property liability for that research.
The goal of these reforms is to channel disclosures of vulnerability
information in legitimate directions. Threats of legal liability may prompt
researchers to offer their discoveries on the (lucrative) black market or to
withhold research altogether, rather than risking a lawsuit by contacting a
vendor or publicizing their findings. The reforms may spur researchers to
undertake additional investigations, producing more information about bugs;
however, any such benefit, while helpful, is secondary to the useful effects on
information distribution.
This Article builds on two underlying normative commitments. First, we
believe that the proposed slate of changes—the Hacker’s Aegis—holds
considerable promise for improving the security and reliability of computer
software. Hackers, like the open source software community, create public
goods by developing information about software flaws. Second, we seek to
defend, and hopefully to reorient the perception of, software security research
more generally. The term hacker, once a cognomen of approval, has become a
term of criticism and even fear. This shift misrepresents researchers’ activities
and the social value they contribute. By protecting software security research,
we hope to change perceptions of it.
Part I of this Article describes the ecosystem in which security researchers
operate. Part II catalogs the intellectual property tools available to threaten and
control hackers, and suggests what doctrinal patches are needed to protect
security research. Part III describes the Article’s three proposed reforms to
mitigate IP’s ill effects in this context. This Article concludes with
observations on how its analysis can be applied outside the realm of computer
software.

27

For a discussion of criminal IP liability for security research, see infra Part III.E.
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I. THE SOFTWARE SECURITY ECOSYSTEM
A. The Stakes
Finding security bugs matters. Users face an increasingly hostile internet
environment—one where malware, viruses, identity theft, phishing, and denialof-service attacks are ubiquitous. In the United States, hackers took control of
over a million personal computers in the last three months of 2009, adding
them to the ten million already infected with rogue code.28 Security firm
Panda Labs tested over twenty-two million computers and found that nearly
half (48.35%) were infected with malware.29 The consequences of suffering a
hack or an infection can be significant, as the loss of sensitive personal data
due to security breaches has become commonplace. A hack at the University
of North Carolina School of Medicine exposed the personal data and medical
information of approximately 160,000 mammography patients.30 The Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave up online banking after nearly
falling for a phishing e-mail that appeared to come from his bank.31 A
vulnerability in one of Time Warner Cable’s standard cable modem/wi-fi
router units allowed hackers to change the device’s settings and potentially
intercept data sent through it.32 Viruses can even spread from infected
personal computers (PCs) to websites.33 Vulnerabilities in software code
create the weaknesses that hackers exploit.
Bugs not only put an individual’s information at risk, they create a threat to
other internet users as well. Security flaws present two forms of negative
externalities. First, each user whose software is compromised increases the
risk to her peers. Computers infected with viruses or malware are often

28 Ellen Nakashima, China Is World Leader in Hacked Computers, Report Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
2010, at A3.
29 See ANTI-PHISHING WORKING GRP., PHISHING ACTIVITY TRENDS REPORT: 3RD QUARTER 2009, at 10
(2009), available at http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_Q3_2009.pdf.
30 Eric Ferreri, UNC Security Breach Less Severe than Thought, NEWS & OBSERVER CAMPUS NOTES
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2009, 3:13 PM), http://blogs.newsobserver.com/campusnotes/unc-security-breach-less-severethan-thought (discussing exposure of about 160,000 files and 114,000 Social Security numbers); Hackers
Attack UNC-Based Mammography Database, UNC HEALTH CARE (Sept. 25, 2009), http://news.unchealthcare.
org/som-vital-signs/archives/vital-signs-sept-25-2009/hackers-attack-unc-based-mammography-database.
31 Elinor Mills, Wife Bans FBI Head from Online Banking, CNET INSECURITY COMPLEX (Oct. 7, 2009,
4:07 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10370164-245.html.
32 Kim Zetter, Time Warner Cable Exposes 65,000 Customer Routers to Remote Hacks, WIRED THREAT
LEVEL (Oct. 20, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/time-warner-cable.
33 Maxim Weinstein, Local Malware Causes Infected Websites, STOPBADWARE BLOG (July 16, 2009),
http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/07/16/local-malware-causes-infected-websites.
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aggregated into botnets that are used to send phishing spam, launch denial-ofservice attacks, or distribute malicious code.34 The harm suffered by the
person with the compromised computer is considerably less than the aggregate
damage to society and other users. Second, users face greater harm than
vendors do, especially overall.35 While precise figures are difficult to
ascertain, reliable estimates of the worldwide economic damage caused by
digital attacks in 2003 range from $12.5 billion for worms and viruses, and
$226 billion for all attacks,36 to $157–$192 billion on Windows PCs alone in
2004.37 Losses to vendors from security breaches, such as from increased
support costs, reputational harm, and declines in share price, are also uncertain,
but likely considerably smaller.38 Vendors, therefore, have less incentive to fix
bugs than is socially optimal.
The rise of cloud computing and mobile computing worsens the problem.
For example, the popular micro-blogging service Twitter suffered a security
breach when a hacker cracked an employee’s Gmail account, giving him
access to business documents stored on Google’s Apps service.39 The hacker
then forwarded confidential company documents to the website TechCrunch,
which published them.40 He also took over the e-mail accounts of senior
executives and gained access to Twitter employees’ phone records, personal email messages, and credit card data.41 Thus, a weakness in a cloud-computing
application—here, the password-recovery feature of Gmail—caused a cascade
of harm to multiple users and to their employer.42 Chinese hackers were able
to penetrate Google’s security to access accounts of human rights activists by

34 See, e.g., Brett Stone-Gross et al., Your Botnet Is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover, 16 PROC.
ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 635, 635 (2009).
35 See Byung Cho Kim et al., An Economic Analysis of the Software Market with a Risk-Sharing
Mechanism, INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM., Winter 2009–2010, at 7, 26–29 (discussing how the security burden
falls on the consumer because software vendors are not directly liable for losses incurred due to poor security).
36 BRIAN CASHELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32331, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERATTACKS 9 tbl.3, 10 tbl.4 (2004).
37 $290 of Malware Damage per Windows PC Worldwide in 2004; XP Service Pack 2 Creates “Haves
and Have Nots” as Road Forks, MI2G (Aug. 24, 2004, 5:45 PM), http://www.mi2g.com/cgi/mi2g/frameset.
php?pageid=http://www.mi2g.com/cgi/mi2g/press/240804.php.
38 See JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY 142–44 (Mike Loukides ed., 2009).
39 Claire Cain Miller & Brad Stone, Twitter Hack Raises Flags on Security, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at
B1.
40 Nik Cubrilovic, The Anatomy of the Twitter Hack, TECHCRUNCH (July 19, 2009), http://www.
techcrunch.com/2009/07/19/the-anatomy-of-the-twitter-attack.
41 Id.
42 Miller & Stone, supra note 39.
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exploiting a security flaw in Microsoft Internet Explorer.43 Similarly, in March
2009, a flaw in Google Docs briefly exposed private documents to the public,
causing the Electronic Privacy Information Center to file a complaint with the
Federal Trade Commission charging Google with a deceptive trade practice.44
As consumers increasingly store data on, and connect to the internet with,
smartphones, vulnerabilities in devices such as Apple’s iPhone,45 and operating
systems such as Google’s Android,46 put sensitive personal information at risk.
The growing move to use phones for payment systems—whether pay-by-SMS
or PayPal—makes hacking phones even more attractive.47
Bugs happen. Inevitably, software code is imperfect.48 While vendors find
and fix some flaws, the demands of the release cycle, and the panoply of
configurations and interactions that software encounters when deployed by
users, ensure that bugs slip through into production code. Some of those bugs
create security weaknesses that can be exploited. The research firm Gartner
calculates that 75% of security breaches result from software flaws.49 Even
large, security-conscious vendors produce vulnerable code. Oracle faces a new
automated tool that allows any minimally skilled computer user to break into
the firm’s database software over the internet.50 In October 2009, Microsoft
released a record number of fixes for Patch Tuesday—even though its code
base did not yet include the new operating system Windows 7.51 Adobe
recently patched a vulnerability in its ubiquitous Acrobat software that allowed
43 Microsoft Admits Explorer Used in Google China Hack, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
8460819.stm (last updated Jan. 15, 2010); Riva Richmond, Microsoft Plugs Security Hole Used in Attacks on
Google, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/microsoft-plugssecurity-hole-used-in-december-attacks.
44 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and
Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/
ftc031709.pdf.
45 Elinor Mills, Researcher Warns of Risks from Rogue iPhone Apps, CNET INSECURITY COMPLEX (Feb.
3, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10446402-245.html (describing “SpyPhone” app).
46 Dean Takahashi, Q&A with Charlie Miller on Hacking the T-Mobile G1 Phone with Google Android
Software, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 28, 2008), http://venturebeat.com/2008/10/28/qa-with-charlie-miller-onhacking-the-t-mobile-g1-phone-with-google-android-software.
47 See VIEGA, supra note 38, at 109–11; Daniel Roth, The Future of Money: It’s Flexible, Frictionless,
and (Almost) Free, WIRED, Mar. 2010, at 70.
48 See VIEGA, supra note 38, at 139–44.
49 STUART OKIN, COMSEC CONSULTING, MANAGING THE COST OF IT SECURITY 4 (2008), http://www.
comsecglobal.com/FrameWork/Upload/Managing the cost of IT Security.pdf.
50 Jim Finkle, Hacking Oracle’s Database Will Soon Get Easier, REUTERS, July 22, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/22/us-oracle-hackers-idUSTRE56L66D20090722.
51 Dan Goodin, Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday Fixes Record Number of Flaws, REGISTER (Oct. 14, 2009,
12:09 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/14/microsoft_patch_tuesday_oct_2009.
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hackers to access data on vulnerable computers—nearly a month after the bug
was first reported and code to exploit it became available.52
Vulnerabilities surface quickly. As Eric Raymond famously observed,
“Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”53 Some users encounter bugs
unexpectedly; others know how to look for them. Hackers are expert in how
software fails.54 While they lack inside information about the software, there
are more of them than there are engineers on quality assurance teams even at
large software firms, and they are highly motivated—by money, by reputation,
and even by ideology. In one week in July 2009, for example, outside
researchers released information about security flaws in the Linux operating
system kernel,55 the Mozilla Firefox browser,56 and the Bluetooth
communications protocol.57
The Chromium open source project has
acknowledged that outside researchers found a number of critical bugs in its
browser, and Google has begun offering rewards to hackers who find flaws in
it.58
Moreover, outsiders have the advantage of time. A software company’s
testers must recheck each new version of a program, and they have a limited
period of time to inspect the final code before it is released to the public.59
Independent researchers can examine the ultimate version at their leisure. In
addition, hackers quickly convert information on security flaws into tools for
exploiting them. One comprehensive study of vulnerabilities found that over
70% of bugs had exploit code available by the time the flaw was publicly

52 Ryan Naraine, Adobe Confirms PDF Zero-Day Attacks. Disable JavaScript Now, ZDNET ZERO DAY
(Dec. 15, 2009, 9:08 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=5119; Ryan Naraine, Adobe Plugs PDF ZeroDay Flaw in Latest Security Makeover, ZDNET ZERO DAY (Jan. 13, 2010, 8:06 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/
security/?p=5234.
53 RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 See, e.g., Interview: Bruce Schneier, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
hackers/interviews/schneier.html (last visited May 13, 2011) (“[Hackers] are the experts in how the systems
work and how the systems fail.”).
55 Dennis Fisher, New Linux Flaw Enables Null Pointer Exploits, THREATPOST (July 17, 2009, 10:45
AM), http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/new-linux-flaw-enables-null-pointer-exploits-071709.
56 Ryan Paul, Firefox 3.5.1 Released to Patch TraceMonkey Vulnerability, ARS TECHNICA (July 19,
2009, 8:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/open-source/news/2009/07/firefox-351-released-to-patch-tracemonkey
-vulnerability.ars.
57 Sumner Lemon, HTC Issues Hotfix for Bluetooth Vulnerability in Smartphones, TECHWORLD (July 20,
2009, 8:29 AM), http://www.techworld.com.au/article/311563/htc_issues_hotfix_bluetooth_vulnerability_
smartphones.
58 Chris Evans, Encouraging More Chromium Security Research, CHROMIUM BLOG (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://blog.chromium.org/2010/01/encouraging-more-chromium-security.html.
59 See JEFF TIAN, SOFTWARE QUALITY ENGINEERING 4–5 (2005).
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disclosed.60 The incidence of “zero day” bugs—security holes that become
public before vendors have software patches ready—is rising sharply.61 In
short, outside researchers will always find flaws that vendors did not catch, and
some of those bugs will have serious security repercussions.
This problem for vendors worsens as software becomes more popular and
more complex. Operating system (OS) software, for example, is particularly
subject to flaws. An OS must expose key aspects of its internal workings to
the software development community, creating the possibility that a bug in an
application can wreak havoc on the operating system.62 As more developers
write applications for the platform, the OS must maintain backwards
compatibility (ensuring that programs written for its earlier versions work with
the latest one) and must test an increasing number of software interactions and
dependencies. Demands from developers, and the need to ensure that older
software continues to run properly, can lead OS vendors to tolerate security
flaws that could be eliminated, but at the cost of sacrificing backwards
compatibility.
For example, Microsoft maintained a weak, easily cracked password
feature (the LAN Manager password hash) in Windows 2000 to avoid breaking
numerous third-party applications written for earlier versions of Windows.63
The trade-off for the Redmond company may have been rational: The benefits
of having additional content running on Windows might outweigh the added
security risks—to Microsoft—of LAN Manager hacks. However, for versions
of the operating system through Windows 2000, LAN Manager was the default
authentication method in certain circumstances.64 Thus, individuals or
companies running Windows would be vulnerable unless they actively took
steps to prevent an attack.65

60 Stefan Frei et al., Large-Scale Vulnerability Analysis, 2006 PROC. ACM SIGCOMM WORKSHOP ON
LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DEF. 131, 135.
61 Id. (“[T]he number of zero-day exploits is increasing dramatically.”).
62 See, e.g., Overview of the Windows API, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK, http://msdn.microsoft.
com/en-us/library/aa383723(VS.85).aspx (last updated Mar. 25, 2010) (“Windows application programming
interface (API) enables [software developers] to exploit the power of Windows. . . . [and] develop applications
that run successfully on all versions of Windows . . . .”).
63 CHAD TODD, HACK PROOFING WINDOWS 2000 SERVER 395 (2001).
64 Id. at 394–400.
65 Cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 85–89 (2008) (discussing effects of default
settings).
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The LAN Manager example highlights a critical puzzle: vendors do not
always act to fix known weaknesses or, at least, to fix them promptly.66
Indeed, companies may learn about vulnerabilities at no cost, as when
independent researchers discover and report bugs.67 Examples abound.
Juniper Networks barred one of its researchers from giving a talk at the Black
Hat and Defcon conferences about a vulnerability in Automated Teller
Machines (ATMs), even though the affected vendor had known of the flaw for
nine months.68 Apple failed to fix three weaknesses in its iCal scheduling
software, despite having four months of advance warning from researchers at
Core Security.69 Sun Microsystems left a vulnerability in its Solaris operating
system unpatched for over six months, even though it allowed hackers to crash
the software via a buffer overflow exploit.70
Bruce Schneier, a security expert, posits two reasons for vendors’ lassitude
in patching such bugs.71 First, he notes that harms from vulnerabilities affect
vendors far less than customers. Bugs create a negative externality.
Furthermore, if customers cannot discern which component of a system is
responsible for a problem—for example, detecting whether the flaw was in the
operating system, the application, or the data—vendors face reduced
reputational or market pressures to improve security.72 Second, customers tend
to value new features or faster releases over slower, more limited, but more
secure, software. Added features generate more sales than reduced bugs.
Even if vendors do patch vulnerabilities, they may not call users’ attention
to the need to install those fixes.73 Despite vendors’ urgings, users cannot
66 See Ashish Arora et al., Optimal Policy for Software Vulnerability Disclosure, 54 MGMT. SCI. 642
(2008) (arguing that vendors patch later than is socially optimal).
67 See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Microsoft Patches IE, Admits It Knew of Bug Last August, COMPUTERWORLD
(Jan. 21, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9147058/Microsoft_patches_IE_admits_it_
knew_of_bug_last_August (describing bug reported by Israeli security company).
68 Robert McMillan, Juniper Nixes ATM Security Talk, PCWORLD (June 30, 2009, 3:20 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/167648/juniper_nixes_atm_security_talk.html.
69 John Leyden, Researchers Out Apple over Unpatched iCal Bugs, REGISTER (May 22, 2008, 5:05 PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/05/22/unpatched_apple_bug_flap.
70 Security Hole in Sun Solaris Left Unpatched for Months, THE H (June 9, 2008, 12:46 PM),
http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/Security-hole-in-Sun-Solaris-left-unpatched-for-months736215.html.
71 Bruce Schneier, The Problem Is Information Insecurity, TECHWATCH TECH BLOG (Aug. 10, 2008),
http://www.techwatch.co.uk/2008/08/10/the-problem-is-information-insecurity.
72 Cf. VIEGA, supra note 38, at 144 (suggesting that vendors derive a greater benefit from allowing
consumers to discover bugs and notify them, rather than from investing their own capital to perfect the
system).
73 See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 2.
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always install each new patch. Large-scale users, especially corporations, have
limited windows in which they can install patches—typically, they do so
several times a year to ensure sufficient time to test the stability of those
changes in their environments.74 Thus, even if a vendor releases a patch,
customers may not have sufficient information to appreciate the relative
necessity of applying it immediately—and those who do may be constrained
from patching by the demands of their computing environment. Software
companies may also be reluctant to reveal flaws due to fears that disclosure can
increase, not decrease, risk.75 Describing a bug—even in the documentation
available with a patch that remedies it—creates hazards.76 Attackers can use
the description to reverse engineer the flaw, and then to create code that
exploits it. This highlights the challenge that vendors, and researchers
practicing responsible disclosure, face: if they describe flaws with too much
precision, hackers can probe the weaknesses, but if they are too general,
customers will encounter difficulty taking precautions. Vendors thus prefer to
keep vulnerabilities secret, believing this best protects them and their
customers while fixes are readied.77 To improve security, though, software
companies need not only to fix vulnerabilities, but to inform users so they can
apply those fixes.78 This is particularly important since black hat hackers—
those who employ vulnerability data to compromise systems for gain—
frequently have access to information about bugs already.79
It may also make economic sense for vendors to underplay bugs. Though
users accept that all software has flaws, a vendor may worry about its
reputation relative to competitors if it publicizes widely each bug it patches.80
The concern is strategic behavior: a competing vendor who keeps
vulnerabilities quiet may enjoy an advantage in perception, even if its
underlying code is no more secure. Absent information to detect this strategy,

74 See Update Management Process, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
cc700845.aspx (last updated June 1, 2007).
75 Cross, supra note 25, at 39–40.
76 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN A. CHRISTIANSEN, INT’L DATA CORP., WHAT ENTERPRISES SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT VENDOR BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITY PATH ISSUANCE 3 (2008) (on file with authors) (advocating
“providing just enough information on a vulnerability to help mitigate risk, but not so much information that a
patch can be reverse engineered”).
77 Id. at 2–3 (describing “silent fixing”).
78 See Bruce Schneier, The Nonsecurity of Secrecy, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2004, at 120, 120 (“We are all
less secure if software vendors don’t make their security vulnerabilities public . . . .”).
79 CHRISTIANSEN, supra note 76, at 2–3.
80 See ORIGINAL SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE QUALITY AND TESTING: A CIO PERSPECTIVE (2008), available
at http://www.origsoft.com/_assets/client/docs/pdf/whitepapers/cio_software_testing_survey.pdf.
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users may assume that the number and severity of reported (and even patched)
bugs correlates with software quality.81 Rational vendors would thus tend to
report bugs less frequently, and with less dissemination, than would be socially
optimal.
The other key aspect of vendors’ decisions is that fixing vulnerabilities is
costly. The cost to fix a bug increases as the software development cycle
progresses; once the code is in production and use—when independent
researchers typically first get access to it—the cost is greatest.82 One study of
United Kingdom businesses found that for every dollar spent on software
development, a company spent seventy-five cents on average to remediate
security flaws.83 Analysts agree that fixing security bugs is expensive, though
quantifying those costs with precision is difficult. Vulnerabilities in web
applications may cost as little as $400 per flaw to fix, while a cross-platform
vulnerability in software such as Oracle’s can require over $1 million.84 An
IDC study found that fixing bugs in applications developed in-house by
corporations costs from $5 million to $22 million per year, depending on the
organization’s size.85
Software code inevitably has weaknesses that internal testing fails to
discover. Outsiders find these flaws in time. Even if they report bugs to the
vendor, that company may not fix the problems for financial or reputational
reasons. This can generate conflicts with outside researchers, whose behavior
and motivations are explored in the next section.
B. Bug Hunters
Independent security researchers are a puzzle: they find bugs for free, even
when software firms normally pay for this work. Broadly speaking, there are
three types of testers: software company employees, consultants, and
independent researchers. Employees—generally called Quality Assurance or
81

See CHRISTIANSEN, supra note 76, at 2.
Vance J. VanDoren, How Communications Help Integration Projects Succeed, CONTROL
ENGINEERING, Apr. 1, 2009, at 42, 43 fig.
83 Warwick Ashford, On-Demand Service Aims to Cut Cost of Fixing Software Security Flaws,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (July 14, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/07/14/
236875/on-demand-service-aims-to-cut-cost-of-fixing-software-security.htm.
84 Kelly Jackson Higgins, The Cost of Fixing an Application Vulnerability, DARK READING (May 11,
2009, 1:56 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/security/app-security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=217400256
(analyzing results from United Kingdom firms).
85 Joy Persaud, Cost of Fixing Software Defects ‘Runs into Millions,’ SC MAG. (July 18, 2008),
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/Cost-of-fixing-software-defects-runs-into-millions/article/112597.
82

BAMBAUER&DAY GALLEYSFINAL

1066

6/6/2011 10:27 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

Quality Engineering—are compensated directly for their work by the software
vendor (their employer).86 Consultants, too, earn remuneration from the
vendor by searching for flaws under contract. Independent researchers,
though, are neither paid by nor affiliated with the vendor. They might benefit
indirectly from their tasks, such as when a tester uses the software herself,
works for a firm that does so, or employs testing as a signal of skill or
experience.87 But most hackers have an attenuated relationship at most with
the producer of the code they try to break.
Independent researchers test for a variety of reasons: possible future
remuneration, intellectual satisfaction, peer recognition, ideological
commitment, animus toward a particular vendor, and expectations in a larger
community of testers, among others.88 In short, their incentives are diverse.
Their actions represent another example of peer production—creation outside
the standard market economy through a disaggregated, informal process.
Scholars such as Jonathan Zittrain,89 Yochai Benkler,90 Eric S. Raymond,91 and
Eric von Hippel92 have analyzed other instances of peer production, from
mapping craters on Mars,93 to Wikipedia,94 to open source software,95 to
kitesurfing.96 Independent bug hunters analyze software for many reasons, but
few are linked directly to financial incentives.
Thus, the standard incentives-based model for intellectual property does not
apply to hackers. Researchers who find bugs can rarely obtain IP protection
for their discoveries, if at all.97 Vulnerability data consists of insight into how
code functions, or fails to do so, and would be unprotectable under copyright
as either an idea, or as an unauthorized derivative work of the underlying

86

TIAN, supra note 59.
See VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION, supra note 11.
88 See generally BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN (1992) (reviewing the development of the
hacker subculture in cyberspace).
89 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008).
90 Benkler, supra note 10.
91 RAYMOND, supra note 12.
92 See sources cited supra note 11.
93 See Dawn Mission: Clickworkers, NASA, http://dawn.jpl.nasa.gov/clickworkers (last visited May 13,
2011).
94 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 70–74 (2006).
95 Id. at 63–67.
96 VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 103–04.
97 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (denying copyright protection to unauthorized derivative works);
Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 348–
54 (2008) (describing how the adaptation right impedes creation of valuable derivative works).
87
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program.98 While a patent on the bug might theoretically be available, the time
lag for prosecution and the existence of the program as prior art make this
possibility largely irrelevant.99 The incentives generated by IP law do little to
spur independent researchers to test code.
Intellectual property doctrine does have a more subtle, second-order effect
on researchers’ behavior, but it affects how they distribute vulnerability data
rather than whether they produce it. Vendors’ goals for distribution effects are
straightforward: they want to be the sole recipients of bug data. IP law can be
deployed to shape when, and with whom, hackers share information regardless
of any effects on whether they conduct such research to begin with. Put
crudely, vendors frequently employ IP law as a gag order.
This approach is significantly misguided. Researchers have an easy and
profitable distribution alternative to sharing data with vendors: they can sell
their discoveries on the black market.100 Organized crime entities, malware
operators, and governments pay well for vulnerabilities in important software
products, particularly those with no known patch or defense. Selling bug data
to the underground is appealing for several reasons. First, it is hard for
vendors to detect these transactions: research on bugs takes place in private, as
does the exchange of exploits for money. Second, the black market typically
pays better for bugs than the legitimate market does.101 In 2006, antivirus
vendor Trend Micro found that code exploiting a vulnerability sells for
$20,000–$30,000 depending upon how widely used the insecure software is
and how reliable the exploit code is, while code that takes over a PC and adds
it to a botnet goes for roughly $5,000.102 Finally, the legal risks are, ironically,
likely lower in this setting. If what a hacker does to enumerate a flaw is

98 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure ineligible for copyright protection), aff’d by an equally divided court,
516 U.S. 233 (1996).
99 In 2010, the average time from filing to patent issuance or abandonment was 35.3 months. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 19 tbl.
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf.
100 Jaziar Radianti & Jose. J. Gonzalez, Toward a Dynamic Modeling of the Vulnerability Black Market
4–7 (Workshop on the Econ. of Securing the Info. Infrastructure, No. 4898, 2006), available at http://wesii.
econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper_id=44.
101 See Andy Greenberg, A Hacker’s Nasdaq, FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/2007/07/06/security-software-hacking-tech-security-cx_ag_0706vulnmarket.html (“‘It’s hard to say no if
the black market offers you $300,000,’ Aitel [chief technology officer of vulnerabilities broker, Immunity]
says.”).
102 Ryan Naraine, Hackers Selling Vista Zero-Day Exploit, EWEEK.COM (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www.
eweek.com/c/a/Security/Hackers-Selling-Vista-ZeroDay-Exploit.
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potentially unlawful, she runs less risk by concealing this activity than by
announcing it to the vendor, the security community, or the larger public. Both
participants to the illegal transaction have incentives to conceal it, and while
they may face criminal penalties if caught, their risk of detection is typically
low.103 The risk is clear: if hackers fear lawsuits for publishing vulnerability
discoveries, they can opt to sell their findings on the black market at lower risk
and greater reward, placing users at risk.
Thus, intellectual property has but a muted effect on the production of
vulnerability data by independent security researchers, but can have a profound
effect on its distribution. However, this impact is perverse: rather than push
bug hunters into sharing information with vendors, it increases the
attractiveness of distribution through illicit channels to consumers who are
likely bad actors. The black market is discreet and profitable. Nonetheless,
vendors continue to deploy a range of IP-based legal weapons in an attempt to
control researchers. The next Part examines these tools.
II. THE VENDOR’S ARSENAL
A. Copyright: Breaking the Censor’s Scissors
The Great Firewall of China has holes. Scholars at the University of
Michigan found key flaws in part of the firewall, Green Dam-Youth Escort,
created by Jinhui Computer System Engineering (JCSE or Jinhui). JCSE built
Green Dam to augment China’s formidable internet censorship apparatus; the
Chinese government mandated that all computer manufacturers install—or at
least ship—the firewall software on every new computer.104 Green Dam not
only censored users’ internet access, it created significant security risks. The
Michigan researchers found that vulnerabilities in the code could permit
malicious websites to take control of a user’s computer to steal personal
information or to enlist the PC in a botnet.105

103

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (amended 2008) (penalizing unauthorized access to computer
systems with imprisonment and fines).
104 Edward Wong & Ashlee Vance, China Intent on Requiring Internet Censor Software, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2009, at A10.
105 Scott Wolchok et al., Analysis of the Green Dam Censorware System, COMPUTER SCI. & ENG’G AT
THE UNIV. OF MICH. (June 18, 2009), http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd.
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Jinhui—already under public pressure for helping China’s government
censor the internet—responded with indignation and a threat.106 The
company’s general manager stated, “It is not responsible to crack somebody’s
software and publish the details, which are commercial secrets, on the Internet.
[The Michigan researchers] have infringed the copyright of our product.”107
He added that Jinhui planned to sue the researchers.108 While a suit in the
United States would likely fail—reverse engineering is protected as fair use
under U.S. copyright law109 and is considered a legitimate practice by trade
secret doctrine110—and the Michigan team would have little to fear from legal
action in China, this response typifies vendors’ reactions to public disclosure
of vulnerabilities. Jinhui patched some of the flaws that the Michigan team
found, yet simultaneously threatened them for performing free quality
control.111 To software companies like JSCE, the perception of security is
often more important than security itself. And when that perception is
threatened, intellectual property threats are often their first response.
The following sections detail the IP theories that software companies use,
and the doctrinal adjustments this Article argues are necessary to protect
security research.
B. Patent
Chris Paget was going to give a presentation at the Black Hat conference in
2007 that would show how to clone an RFID (radio frequency identifier)
chip—the kind used in cards to control access to buildings, in tags that allow
drivers to pay tolls without stopping, and in passports to verify one’s
identity.112 His subject was an RFID sensor made by HID Global; Paget chose
the company because it produced the ID cards in the building where his
employer, IOActive, was located.113

106 Edward Wong, China: Artist Urges Online Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A11; Green Dam
Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (June 15, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://english.people.
com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6678151.html.
107 Green Dam Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, supra note 106.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
110 See, e.g., Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982).
111 Green Dam Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, supra note 106.
112 Paul F. Roberts, Lawsuits, Patent Claims Silence Black Hat Talk, INFOWORLD (Feb. 27, 2007, 9:30
AM), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/lawsuits-patent-claims-silence-black-hat-talk-720.
113 Paul F. Roberts, Battle Brewing over RFID Chip-Hacking Demo, INFOWORLD (Feb. 26, 2007, 3:45
PM), http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/02/26/HNblackhatrfid_1.html.
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HID Global objected, strongly. Their letter to IOActive demanded that the
research firm not publish information about how to “spoof” HID’s cards, or
face legal action for patent infringement.114 HID asserted Paget’s cloning
would violate two of its patents, which cover an identification system using
passive integrated transponders.115 The threat created significant legal risk for
Paget and IOActive: if their cloner was covered by the claims of one or more
of HID’s patents and they proceeded in the face of the vendor’s warnings, they
would be liable for willful patent infringement. Willful infringement subjects
a defendant to increased damages—up to three times actual damages116—and
attorney’s fees.117 Patent law operates under strict liability: if Paget’s actions
constituted using HID’s invention, he would be liable, regardless of how
laudatory his purpose. He and IOActive decided not to give the offending
presentation, and Black Hat staffers tore their prepared materials out of the
conference packets.118 Instead, the researchers gave a generic presentation,
with no mention of HID or its technology.119
Patent protection is among the most powerful weapons a software vendor
can deploy to control its code. Patent law confers a monopoly over making,
using, selling, or offering to sell the protected invention.120 Infringement
operates under strict liability: anyone who creates a product, or performs a
process, that incorporates all elements listed in a patent’s claims violates the
patent owner’s rights.121 Defenses are scant,122 and damages are at least a

114

Letter from HID Global to IOActive (Feb. 21, 2007) (on file with authors).
See U.S. Patent No. 5,041,826 (filed Feb. 16, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 5,166,676 (filed Feb. 16, 1990).
116 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(noting that the court earlier held that “an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful
infringement”).
117 35 U.S.C. § 285; see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (attorney’s
fees available in exceptional cases).
118 Ryan Naraine, Legal Threat Forces Cancellation of Black Hat RFID Hacking Demo, ZDNET ZERO
DAY (Feb. 27, 2007, 6:50 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=102&tag=col1;post-103.
119 Larry Greenemeier, Black Hat ‘RFID’ Compromise Is a Win for Security, INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb.
28, 2007), http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197700210.
120 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
121 See, e.g., Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
122 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (amended 2010) (permitting limited infringement for regulatory data submission);
id. § 273 (defining prior inventor defense); id. § 282 (defining noninfringement, unenforceability, invalidity,
and failure to comply with reissue requirements); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (defining patent misuse). But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (listing conduct not qualifying as
misuse); Akron Polymer Container, Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(defining inequitable conduct before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech.,
Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (defining first use or patent exhaustion); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining implied license).
115
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reasonable royalty for use plus interest.123 There is no fair use in patent law: at
most, an “experimental use” exception immunizes use of an invention for
“amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”124
Any commercial use places an infringer outside this safe harbor.125 Thus,
patent law incorporates none of the utility calculus present in the copyright126
or trademark127 fair use defenses; no matter how beneficial a researcher’s
findings, if they are obtained in violation of a patent, without authorization, the
researcher is liable.
Paget and IOActive made the rational choice to alter their presentation.
But society is ill served by patent’s strict liability in the software security
context. RFID tags, for example, are becoming ubiquitous, appearing in
subway fare cards,128 animal identification implants,129 library books,130
bicycle race trackers,131 and shipments of Oxycontin.132 Vulnerabilities in
their operation133 have become particularly worrisome now that RFIDs play a
key role in governmental operations such as border control (passports134) and
Department of Defense procurement.135 Paget demonstrated the risks: with a
few hundred dollars of equipment loaded into his Volvo, he was able to “skim”
the serial numbers for six passport cards within an hour of driving along San

123

35 U.S.C. § 284.
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
§ 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)) (permitting acts otherwise considered
infringement, such as in Bolar, when in the narrow context of pursuing FDA approval).
125 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
126 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
127 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306–08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing fair use).
128 Andrew Heining, Another RFID Smart Card Vulnerability Exposed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 8,
2008, 1:10 PM), http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2008/10/08/another-rfid-smart-card-vulnerabilityexposed.
129 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NAIS) (2007),
available at http://www.ftcldf.org/docs/R.pdf.
130 See, e.g., David Molnar & David Wagner, Privacy and Security in Library RFID: Issues, Practices,
and Architectures, 11 PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 210 (2004).
131 Daniel Lee, Just 1 Minute, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 25, 2006, at 1C.
132 Elena Malykhina, Drugmaker Ships RFID Tags with OxyContin, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004,
at 20.
133 See, e.g., Russell Ryan et al., Anatomy of a Subway Hack (2008) (PowerPoint presentation),
http://tech.mit.edu/V128/N30/subway/Defcon_Presentation.pdf (describing how MIT students hacked the
RFID-based Charlie Card system for the Boston subway system).
134 See, e.g., U.S. Passport Card, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_
3926.html (last visited May 13, 2011).
135 See, e.g., Radio Frequency Identification, 48 C.F.R. § 252.211–7006 (2010).
124
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Francisco’s Fisherman’s Wharf.136 Despite these problems, researchers cannot
lawfully test HID’s RFID chips without authorization, and even if they go
ahead without permission, they cannot legally distribute their findings, since
doing so would prove infringement. HID thus obtains an effective veto over
probing its patented products to assess their security.
Change to protect software security research could come from revising the
Patent Act or reinterpreting the experimental use exception.137 Legislation to
exempt security research from infringement would be in line with prior moves
to create exceptions to liability. Congress has previously created exemptions
for socially beneficial uses that would otherwise infringe, from protecting
doctors against liability for using protected surgical methods138 to allowing
prior users of a patented business method to continue employing it.139 Creating
a narrow exception to patent liability for security research would equally shield
helpful activity that would otherwise be subject to injunctive prohibition.140
Unlike the surgical methods exemption, though, any protection for security
research would likely need to protect tools specifically adapted to the patented
method, since software programs needed to probe a vulnerability could
otherwise infringe contributorily.141
Alternatively, federal courts (in particular the Federal Circuit) could
reinterpret the experimental use exception to cover security research.142 This
would necessitate extending immunity to commercial uses of a patent; current
doctrine mandates that a defendant’s activity be noncommercial.143 Security
research is often commercial, even if indirectly, and thus even widening the
ambit of the common law exemption might not ameliorate the chilling effects.
136 Chips in Official IDs Raise Privacy Fears, FOXNEWS.COM, July 11, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,531720,00.html.
137 The much-anticipated Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), addressing
the eligibility of business methods for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), does not appear to have
changed the situation facing researchers. Software remains eligible subject matter for patent protection,
assuming it meets the other requirements for patentability. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227–28.
138 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
139 Id. § 273(b).
140 Injunctive relief for patent infringement is typical, but not automatic. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
141 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (excluding from the exemption “use of a patented machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter in violation of [a surgical method] patent”).
142 See Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 632 & n.14 (1990) (noting that 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) did not alter the Bolar definition of the exception, but rather “changed the narrow application of
the doctrine affecting reporting requirements for federal drug laws”).
143 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[1] (2010) (collecting experimental use cases).
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The current experimental use exception tracks a bright-line divide between
commercial and philosophical activity, rather than weighing the costs and
benefits of the infringing acts. However, given the history of specialized
legislative exceptions in patent law, courts are probably more likely to defer to
Congress than to engage in particularized cost–benefit analysis.144
Patent law is a potent weapon for vendors who seek to limit creation and
dissemination of vulnerability data. While reinterpreting the experimental use
exception to liability could help researchers, it is more likely that congressional
action to establish a security research exception is necessary to overcome
patent law’s negative effects.
C. Trade Secret
There may be such a thing as a free lunch—and free laundry, and soft
drinks—at schools that use the Blackboard Transaction System (BTS).145 BTS
lets students use their identification cards to pay for goods and services on
campus. Billy Hoffman, a student at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and
Virgil Griffith, a student at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa,
discovered fundamental flaws in Blackboard’s system.146 For example, BTS
did not encrypt the data involved in processing a purchase; instead, the system
depended on physical security to prevent access to the data.147 However,
Hoffman easily bypassed Georgia Tech’s physical restrictions with a low-tech
hack: he removed four screws holding a locked machine door in place with a
“cheap metal knife.”148 Doing so gave him access to the devices that
controlled the laundry room in which the box was located—and potentially to
the rest of the system as well.149 Hoffman could now perform a replay attack

144

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (granting exemption from infringement liability for uses related to
developing and submitting data under federal law regulating drugs).
145 See BLACKBOARD, BLACKBOARD TRANSACTION SYSTEM (2004), available at http://library.blackboard.
com/docs/CS/Bb_Transaction_System_Brochure.pdf.
146 Virginia Heffernan, Internet Man of Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008 (Magazine), at 38; Michael
Margolis, Card Systems Prove Insecure, W. COURIER (Macomb, Ill.), Apr. 25, 2003, http://media.www.
westerncourier.com/media/storage/paper650/news/2003/04/25/News/Card-Systems.Prove.Insecure445193.shtml.
147 John R. Hall, Blackboard Transaction System Cease and Desist FAQ, YAK’S LAIR, http://www.yak.
net/mirrors/bb-faq.html (last visited May 13, 2011).
148 Farhad Manjoo, The Copyright Cops Strike Again, SALON.COM (Apr. 15, 2003), http://dir.salon.com/
story/tech/feature/2003/04/15/acidus.
149 Acidus, CampusWide Wide Open, CRYPTOME, http://cryptome.org/campuswide.txt (last visited May
13, 2011). Hoffman published under the pseudonym Acidus. Margolis, supra note 146.
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against BTS.150 By monitoring communication over the BTS network during a
transaction, Hoffman could duplicate it, giving him an unlimited supply of free
laundry cycles and beverages.
Hoffman contacted Blackboard about his findings, but claimed he was
“blown off” by the company.151 He and Griffith subsequently planned to
present their research on BTS vulnerabilities at the Interz0ne computer
conference in Atlanta, Georgia.152 In addition, Hoffman wrote an article
covering BTS weaknesses under a pseudonym for the hacker magazine 2600:
The Hacker Quarterly. He closed the piece by stating, “Hopefully this article
will force Blackboard to change to a more secure system.”153
It didn’t. But Blackboard did manage to change Hoffman’s proposed talk.
The day before Hoffman and Griffith were scheduled to present at Interz0ne,
Blackboard obtained a temporary injunction from a Georgia state court
blocking them from: discussing signal traffic on a BTS network; revealing how
information was stored in the BTS system or readers; describing how to create
compatible readers; releasing Blackboard emulation code or hardware; or
claiming they could provide products or services that legitimately could
interact with a Blackboard product.154 The injunction also required the
students to remove any such information from their websites.155 Finally,
Blackboard sent a letter to Interz0ne’s conference chair stating that the
conference could be held liable, even criminally liable, if it permitted Hoffman
and Griffith to present their research, or if Interz0ne failed to remove
information about BTS from its materials.156
Blackboard relied on several legal theories to bolster its case for the
temporary injunction, including violations of the Federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),157

150

Acidus, supra note 149.
Manjoo, supra note 148.
152 Margolis, supra note 146.
153 Acidus, supra note 149.
154 Order Temporarily Enjoining Billy Hoffman and Virgil Griffith, Blackboard Inc. v. Hoffman, No.
1:03-CV-1279 (CC) (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Order], available at http://www.eff.org/files/
filenode/Blackboard_v_Hoffman/20020412-Blackboard-TRO.pdf.
155 Id. at 2.
156 Cease and Desist Letter from Gregory S. Smith, Attorney for Blackboard Inc., to Interz0ne II
Conference Chair (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.interz0ne.com/events/interz0ne_cease_order.html.
157 The complaint refers to the “Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act” but cites the statutory sections for the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act “18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.” Verified Complaint at 7, Blackboard Inc. v.
151
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the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, and the Lanham Act, but
focused principally on the Georgia Trade Secrets Act.158 Its complaint
repeatedly referred to Hoffman’s hacker background, attempting to balance
dire descriptions of the threat from his presentation with qualifications about
the accuracy of Hoffman’s claims about BTS security.159 Blackboard claimed
that the presentation risked “massive fraud, security breaches, and other harms,
threatening both the physical and financial security of college students.”160
Tellingly, though, Blackboard stated publicly that it wasn’t “really worried
about [the] security of the system,” but instead was “worried about the
reputation of the system.”161 Hoffman and Griffith focused attention on BTS’s
dependence on physical protection for the system’s security—and on how
readily those physical methods could be compromised. Blackboard compared
the students’ research to breaking into an ATM, eliding the far greater security
protections built into those machines.162 The company sought both to
minimize the findings, calling Hoffman a mere “vandal,” while also justifying
the ban on disclosing information about the vulnerability with warnings about
the risk Hoffman created.163 The restraining order, and a subsequent
confidential settlement, blocked Hoffman and Griffith from presenting at
Interz0ne, though the ensuing publicity drew attention to the BTS flaws.164
Trade secret triumphed over toolboxes.
Trade secret law protects information that has economic value because it is
not generally known, and that is the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy.165
Examples include customer lists, Google’s algorithm for building search
results,166 and the formula for Coca-Cola.167 Software can qualify for trade
Hoffman, No. 1:03-CV-1279 (CC) (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/
files/filenode/Blackboard_v_Hoffman/20020411-Blackboard-complaint.pdf.
158 Id. at 5–8.
159 Id. at 2–4, 8.
160 Id. at 8.
161 Anitha Reddy, Blackboard Gets Gag Order Against Smart-Card Hackers, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2003,
at E1 (emphases added).
162 See, e.g., Andrea L. Foster, Judge Prevents Students from Discussing Security of Debit-Card System,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), May 2, 2003, at 40.
163 Blackboard Statement on Client System Security, BLACKBOARD, http://library.blackboard.com/docs/
Statement_on_System_Security.pdf (last visited May 13, 2011); see also Hall, supra note 147.
164 Heffernan, supra note 146.
165 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
166 Tom McNichol, Can Microsoft’s Bing Take a Bite out of Google?, TIME (July 31, 2009), http://www.
time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1913841,00.html.
167 2 Sentenced in Coke Trade Secret Case, CNNMONEY.COM (May 23, 2007, 3:54 PM), http://money.
cnn.com/2007/05/23/news/newsmakers/coke/index.htm.
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secret status, even when the compiled object code is sold to the public.168
Trade secrets are protected by injunctions preventing their disclosure169 when a
defendant has obtained them through improper means;170 holders can also
obtain damages.171 However, trade secret laws expressly permit the use of
reverse engineering to discover protected information; only the acquisition of a
secret through improper means creates liability.172 Where researchers obtain
information about security flaws in software or hardware through reverse
engineering, their subsequent use and disclosure of that information is beyond
the reach of trade secret liability.173 Accordingly, reform to protect researchers
may require only that judges scrutinize trade secret claims more searchingly
when reverse engineering is involved.
However, there are at least two complications with trade secret law and
software research. First, software vendors often include language in the enduser license agreement governing their software that forbids reverse
engineering.174 While such language would be unlikely to create liability for
copyright infringement, since limited reverse engineering typically qualifies as
fair use,175 the contractual obligation might be sufficient to make a software
user responsible for maintaining the trade secret.176 Copyright law faces a
similar question when end-user license agreements prohibit reverse

168

See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991).
170 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 2010) (defining “[i]mproper means” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
171 See, e.g., Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 736–37 (5th Cir. 1982).
172 Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer
Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975). See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
173 The Georgia Trade Secrets Act expressly exempts from liability information acquired from reverse
engineering. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(1) (2009) (“Reverse engineering of a trade secret not acquired by
misappropriation or independent development shall not be considered improper means.”).
174 For example, Microsoft expressly forbids reverse engineering in the license agreement for its Windows
XP operating system. MICROSOFT, MICROSOFT WINDOWS XP HOME EDITION (RETAIL) END-USER LICENSE
AGREEMENT FOR MICROSOFT SOFTWARE § 4 (2004), available at http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/
eula/home.mspx. Some vendors are even more restrictive: Network Associates promulgated an end-user
license agreement that required the company’s approval before publishing reviews or disclosing results from
testing the software. Ed Foster, Some New Shrink-Wrap License Terms Seem Tailor-Made for UCITA,
INFOWORLD, Mar. 5, 2001, at 82, 87. The New York state attorney general filed suit to block this provision as
contrary to consumer protection laws and won an order prohibiting Network Associates from enforcing it.
People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 471 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (granting injunction requested by
attorney general).
175 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2000).
176 See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993).
169
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engineering; even where decompilation would be protected by fair use,177 such
action would create liability for breach of contract.178 The effort to regulate
contract law for computer information transactions via the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), for example, recognized the potential
adverse effects of such contractual provisions.179 Indeed, the 2002 version of
UCITA prohibited contracts banning reverse engineering by declaring them
unenforceable.180 However, UCITA’s effects have been minimal, as only two
states have transposed its provisions into law.181 Thus, vendors may be able to
circumvent trade secret’s safe harbor via contract.
Second, some researchers may switch sides, working first as an employee
or consultant, and then moving to perform independent testing. In this case,
the software company may have a plausible claim that the researcher’s work is
influenced by her knowledge of the firm’s trade secrets. Mike Lynn’s situation
with Cisco exemplifies this problem; Lynn began his work on the flaws in
Cisco’s routers while covered by a nondisclosure agreement.182 Once he
resigned from his position with ISS, Lynn transitioned to independent research,
but Cisco argued, plausibly, that his work was influenced by exposure to
Cisco’s proprietary information.183
The case for legal reform in the trade secret context is more compelling for
reverse engineering than for researchers who switch sides. Allowing software
companies to reify a license agreement into a trade secret claim would confer
complete control over research into vulnerabilities in software that involves
any decompilation or reverse engineering—which most security testing
does.184 Accepting the terms of a software end-user license agreement is
177 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
reverse engineering can constitute fair use).
178 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–28 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding
restrictions consistent with the Copyright Act, finding breach of a license agreement prohibiting reverse
engineering, and affirming monetary damages award).
179 We thank Maureen O’Rourke for this insight.
180 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 118(b) (amended 2002), 7 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 290 (2009 &
Supp. 2010); see also Jonathan Band, Closing the Interoperability Gap: NCCUSL’s Adoption of a Reverse
Engineering Exception in UCITA, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., May 2002, at 1, 4.
181 Maryland and Virginia have adopted the UCITA. See Maryland Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-102 to -816 (West 2010); Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (West 2010).
182 Cisco Acts to Silence Researcher, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4724791.stm
(last updated July 28, 2005).
183 Complaint for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Breach of Contract at 3–7, Cisco
Sys., Inc. v. Lynn, No. C05-03043-JL (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
184 See ELDAD EILAM, REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING 7–8 (2005).
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generally a prerequisite for using a lawful copy of that program. Researchers
thus face a cruel choice: either use an unlawful copy in their research, or agree
to terms preventing them from engaging in the activity that necessitates
installing the program. To mitigate this problem, courts interpreting software
license agreements, and state legislatures adopting and modifying trade secret
statutes, should reinforce the position that reverse engineering does not
constitute improper means.185 Provisions banning reverse engineering could
be voided on public policy grounds, for example. In addition, security research
should be exempted from trade secret liability, unless the plaintiff can prove
improper means.186 An exemption would shift the burden of proof to the
software’s owner and would continue to protect against breaches of
nondisclosure agreements. This proposal accords with the goal of trade secret
doctrine, which is to enable the protection of proprietary information that
confers a competitive advantage. Security researchers seek not to compete
with the software they test, but to improve its resilience and robustness.
Further, breach of an end-user license agreement should give rise, at most, to a
claim for breach of contract. Unlike trade secret claims, contract-based ones
rarely justify injunctive relief, and plaintiffs must prove actual damages to
recover.187
Trade secret doctrine is created primarily by state law, although theft of
trade secrets can create federal criminal liability.188 Thus, ensuring uniform
protection for security research requires either action by each state to protect
reverse engineering, or a federal statute enshrining this shield nationally.
While some states already safeguard reverse engineering via statute,
researchers may nonetheless face restrictions based on trade secret law.
Hoffman and Griffith, for example, were subject to a temporary restraining
order based in part on Blackboard’s trade secret claim,189 even though

185 Trade secrets statutes typically prohibit acquisition of protected information via improper means.
Most states follow the formulation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which defines improper means as
including “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
537 (2005). States such as California expressly protect reverse engineering as an exception to trade secret
liability. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2010) (“Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone
shall not be considered improper means.”).
186 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (2006) (DMCA security research exemption).
187 See Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L.
REV. 346, 348, 351 (1981).
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006).
189 See Order, supra note 154; Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6.
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Georgia’s trade secret statute exempts reverse engineering from liability.190
Accordingly, even states that protect reverse engineering in theory may need
stronger liability shields in practice. This suggests that, if states fail to accord
adequate protection to software security research as a legitimate activity under
their trade secret laws, Congress may need to pass safe harbor legislation that
preempts conflicting state statutes. Though trade secret law is historically the
province of state regulation, the Federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996
criminalizes the theft, copying, distribution, sale, or receipt of unlawfully
acquired trade secrets.191 If federal law can be employed to augment trade
secret when necessary, it can (and should) be deployed to limit the doctrine
when its effects are pernicious.
D. Trademark
Unsurprisingly, trademark has been the legal doctrine least frequently
employed by vendors to control software security research. Researchers are
normally careful to note that their work does not bear the imprimatur or
approval of a software vendor, and any references to a product or service
would likely fall under the nominative use exception to trademark liability.192
Furthermore, hackers are not offering competing products or appealing to
consumers in a way that could cause confusion about source.193 Blackboard,
for example, included a claim under federal trademark law (the Lanham Act)
in its complaint against Hoffman and Griffith over their BTS work.194 As the
Chilling Effects project notes, though, their position was “far-fetched at best,”
since Hoffman was neither passing off his work as Blackboard’s, nor implying
endorsement by the company.195 Researchers are at pains both to claim credit
for their work, and to demonstrate when a vendor has failed to follow their
independent advice.
Trademark law—at least, federal trademark law—likely does not require
modification to protect security research. However, exemption from liability
does involve thoughtful judicial application of doctrine. For example, the
190

See supra note 173.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
192 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(describing nominative use).
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (prohibiting use of a mark that is likely to cause confusion about
origin, sponsorship, or approval).
194 Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6–7.
195 Jennifer Jenkins, Blackboard Erases Research Presentation with Cease-and-Desist, TRO, CHILLING
EFFECTS (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=383.
191
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nominative use defense (one species of trademark’s fair use defense) should
immunize researchers who use a software product’s mark to denominate the
code to which their findings apply.196 If hackers are careful in how they
describe their work, consumer confusion should be minimal if not nonexistent.
Similarly, federal dilution law provides express protection for nominative and
descriptive fair use (including use to criticize or comment on the mark’s
owner), for news commentary employing a mark, and for noncommercial
use.197 Courts in different circuits, though, apply the nominative use defense
differently.198 Some judges may be receptive to vendors’ suggestions that the
use of their marks implies sponsorship or approval of the security researcher’s
work, on a likelihood of confusion theory.199 Researchers would improve their
chances of successfully asserting a nominative fair use defense through steps
that reduce the potential to confuse computer consumers, such as through
disclaimer statements that expressly negate any connection between the hacker
and the software vendor.200
While trademark law has seen limited use against security researchers, the
doctrine’s built-in safeguards suggest that legal reform may not be
immediately necessary so long as they are conscientiously applied.
E. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Though there are few court cases applying it to security research, the
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) recur frequently as a threat employed against hackers. In 2002,
Hewlett-Packard (HP) fulminated against SNOsoft’s publishing code that
permitted an attacker to gain root (administrator) privileges on HP’s Tru64
Unix operating system via a buffer overflow exploit, characterizing it as a

196

See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307–08 (discussing nominative use).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
198 Compare Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2005)
(positioning nominative fair use as affirmative defense), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796,
801 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a nominative use defense simply changes the likelihood of confusion
methodology), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)), as recognized in Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).
199 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A).
200 Cf. Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 231 (“[A] disclaimer must be considered in determining
whether the alleged infringer accurately portrayed the relationship that existed between plaintiff and
defendant.”).
197
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DMCA violation.201 Though HP invoked the specter of criminal sanctions for
SNOsoft’s post,202 the researchers also faced civil liability.203 HP had known
about the vulnerability since 2001—a different researcher had posted a
separate exploit that achieved root access—but had not issued a patch.204
When HP Chief Executive Carly Fiorina and the company were inundated with
complaints from researchers, reporters, and even HP employees, the firm
retreated from its threats against SNOsoft.205 Nonetheless, the incident
prompted a number of attendees at the Black Hat conference that year to
consider the possibility of reducing vulnerability sharing with vendors,206 and
HP stated that it would forgo legal threats if researchers would “reveal security
threats using industry standard security practice.”207
Similarly, in 2003, Princeton graduate student J. Alex Halderman (now a
professor at the University of Michigan) analyzed MediaMax CD3, a copy
protection scheme for music CDs from SunnComm.208 SunnComm claimed
that the program offered “a verifiable and commendable level of security,” but
Halderman found that computer users could evade its restrictions through the
simple expedient of holding down the Shift key (thereby disabling Microsoft
Windows’ Autorun feature) when loading the CD.209 Doing so kept the disc
from loading a device driver that blocked users from copying music.210 Users
who allowed the CD to install the driver software could also disable it using
instructions Halderman provided.211

201 Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA Threat, CNET NEWS (July 30, 2002, 4:48 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-947325.html; see also Letter from Kent Ferson, Vice President, HewlettPackard Unix Sys. Unit, to Adriel T. Desautels, Founder, SNOsoft (July 29, 2002), available at http://www.
politechbot.com/docs/hp.dmca.threat.073002.html.
202 McCullagh, supra note 201.
203 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a), (c) (2006); McCullagh, supra note 201.
204 McCullagh, supra note 201. The exploit code is available at http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/
0101-exploits/tru-64.su.c.
205 Kim Zetter, HP, Bug-Hunters Declare Truce, PCWORLD (Aug. 9, 2002, 6:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/103853/hp_bughunters_declare_truce.html.
206 Id.
207 Declan McCullagh, HP Backs Down on DMCA Warning, ZDNET UK (Aug. 2, 2002, 7:45 AM),
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/itmanagement/0,1000000308,2120211,00.htm (quoting HP General Manager Martin
Fink) (internal quotation mark omitted).
208 J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, COMPUTER SCI. &
ENG’G AT THE UNIV. OF MICH. (Nov. 13, 2004), http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/cd3.
209 Id. See generally Brij Khurana, Halderman GS Sees Copy-Protection Flaw in New CDs, DAILY
PRINCETONIAN, Oct. 9, 2003, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2003/10/09/8785 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
210 Halderman, supra note 208.
211 Khurana, supra note 209.
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Halderman’s work had a significant effect—SunnComm’s stock dropped in
value by $10 million in the days after its release.212 SunnComm responded.
The company released a statement indicating that it would sue Halderman for
violating the DMCA and would refer the matter to federal law enforcement for
possible criminal proceedings.213 The company specifically cited his paper
(published on Halderman’s website) as “‘disseminated in a manner which
facilitates infringement’ in violation of the DMCA or other applicable law,”214
calling it potentially “a felony.”215 The company later acknowledged the
potential chilling effect of such lawsuits on academic security research.216
Both HP and SunnComm rescinded their threats after a wave of
unfavorable publicity. But the threat of suit under the DMCA has impeded
research into software vulnerabilities, even by academics at major
universities.217 Halderman and Ed Felten, his advisor, delayed publishing data
about security flaws in the Sony BMG copy protection system for CDs for a
month while consulting counsel about managing DMCA risk.218 While they
did so, consumers of Sony music CDs remained vulnerable to hackers who
could use a flaw in the anti-copying software to surreptitiously install software
on their computers.219 (Felten was familiar with DMCA threats, having faced
one from the Secure Digital Music Initiative when he cracked the group’s
music watermarking scheme and sought to present his research at an academic
212 John Borland, Student Faces Suit over Key to CD Locks, CNET NEWS (Oct. 9, 2003, 2:01 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025-5089168.html.
213 Tony Smith, SunnComm to Sue ‘Shift Key’ Student for $10m, REGISTER (Oct. 9, 2003, 8:48 PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/09/sunncomm_to_sue_shift_key.
214 Id. (quoting a SunnComm press release) (internal quotation mark omitted).
215 Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won’t Sue Grad Student, ZDNET (Oct. 10, 2003, 9:16 PM),
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-132123.html.
216 Press Release, SunnComm Techs. Inc., SunnComm Technologies Reverses Decision to Bring Legal
Action Against Princeton Researcher (Oct. 10, 2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20031016165917/
http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?prid=200310101150.
217 See generally FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: TWELVE
YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12years.pdf; J. Alex Halderman, Princeton Univ., Legal Challenges in Security Research (Oct. 12, 2006)
(PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/talks/lawsec-ufl06.ppt.
218 Comment of Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman to the U.S. Copyright Office, Regarding RM
2005-11—Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/doc/2005/dmcacomment.pdf.
219 The Sony BMG software employed a rootkit—a storage space invisible to the operating system—to
hide its tools. Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far, MARK’S
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 AM), http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkitsand-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx. However, attackers could also conceal their software in the
rootkit. See John Borland, Sony CD Protection Sparks Security Concerns, CNET NEWS (Nov. 1, 2005, 4:41
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Sony-CD-protection-sparks-security-concerns/2100-7355_3-5926657.html.
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conference.)220 Andrew “Bunnie” Huang had two companies—including a
self-publishing firm—back out of publishing his book on hacking Microsoft’s
Xbox (including analysis of the system’s security) due to fears of DMCA
liability.221 University of Michigan graduate student Niels Provos moved his
research publications out of the United States and tried to block American
citizens from accessing them due to fears of running afoul of the DMCA and a
similar Michigan state statute.222 Even White House Office of Cyber Security
chief Richard Clarke cited the “potential chilling effect on vulnerability
research” in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.223 The
DMCA has proved a potent weapon, enabling software companies to dissuade
or limit security researchers, and its power is perhaps best demonstrated by its
ability to compel adherence even with infrequent formal legal proceedings.
The DMCA contains statutory exceptions that could shield security
researchers from liability, including protections for reverse engineering,224
encryption research,225 and security testing.226 However, the safe harbors are
so narrow that they are effectively useless, as the extant caselaw demonstrates.
Of 141 decided cases involving § 1201 of the DMCA, only one involved a
claim of protection under the security testing safe harbor, and in it the safe
harbor was held inapplicable.227 The same case was the only one to involve an
unsuccessful attempt to rely on the encryption research exemption,228 and four
cases had unsuccessful claims for the reverse engineering safe harbor.229
While these results cover only reported, decided cases (and hence may not be a
representative sample), the lack of success in using any of the safe harbors—

220 See Scott A. Craver et al., Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge, 10 PROC.
USENIX SECURITY SYMP. (2001), available at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec01/craver.pdf.
221 David Becker, Testing Microsoft and the DMCA, CNET NEWS (Apr. 15, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://news.
cnet.com/2008-1082-996787.html (quoting Huang’s description of “a flaw in the system initializer that lets
you put code anywhere in the system that you want it”).
222 Kevin Poulsen, ‘Super-DMCA’ Fears Suppress Security Research, SECURITYFOCUS (Apr. 14, 2003),
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/3912.
223 Hiawatha Bray, Cyber Chief Speaks on Data Network Security, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2002, at C2.
224 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).
225 Id. § 1201(g).
226 Id. § 1201(j).
227 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
228 Id.
229 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Divineo, Inc., 457 F.
Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294.
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and the infrequency with which they are raised—suggests that the built-in
statutory mechanisms are insufficiently protective of security researchers.
This conclusion is bolstered by qualitative analysis of the exemptions. To
qualify for the security testing safe harbor, a researcher must: obtain
authorization from the owner of the computer, system, or network involved in
testing (which might be particularly challenging for cloud-computing
research); not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA); use
findings solely to improve the security of the computer, system, or network’s
owner, or share them directly with the network, system, or computer’s
developer; and use or maintain the information derived from testing so as not
to facilitate DMCA infringement or violate other applicable laws, such as those
related to privacy and security.230 Similarly, to assess vulnerabilities in
software encryption, such as that employed in the Transport Layer Security
protocol used to protect e-commerce,231 a researcher must lawfully obtain a
copy of the software or hardware, seek authorization from the owner of the
rights in that technology, and not violate other laws (including the CFAA).232
Moreover, the statute conditions the exemption on the researcher’s
qualifications, the way in which she disseminates her findings, and whether the
researcher provides the copyright owner with documentation of findings in a
timely fashion.233 The statutory safe harbors are not only narrow, but also
uncertain—it is not always clear what conduct violates laws such as the CFAA,
nor what constitutes timely provision of information to copyright owners.234
The DMCA permits users who are adversely affected by its restrictions in
their ability to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works to petition the
Librarian of Congress to exempt certain classes of works from the statute’s
ambit.235 However, these exemptions expire after three years, and a user who
seeks to continue the exemption must petition for renewal from scratch.236 The
first three rounds of exemption rule making did not result in additional

230

17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1)–(3).
See Marsh Ray, Authentication Gap in TLS Renegotiation, EXTENDED SUBSET (Nov. 5, 2009, 3:20
AM), http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8.
232 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2).
233 Id. § 1201(g)(3).
234 On the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), see generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449
(C.D. Cal. 2009), in which a court granted a motion for acquittal for a defendant convicted of violating CFAA
via conduct that contravened MySpace’s terms of service.
235 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(D).
236 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,073 (Oct. 6, 2008) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
231
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protections that could benefit security researchers.237 The last round of rule
making included one exemption for security testing of video games, provided
the information derived is used primarily to promote the security of the owner
or operator of a computer, computer system, or network, and the information is
not used or maintained such that it facilitates unlawful activity.238 This
exemption is quite similar to the existing statutory exemption for security
testing, but is intended to cover situations where the researcher is not trying to
gain access to a computer, system, or network.239 In short, while it is possible
for adversely affected users to petition for exemptions from liability, such
exemptions are narrow, short-lived, and vigorously opposed by vendors.240
Reform of the DMCA to provide greater protection for software security
research is straightforward. As currently written, the statute canonizes one
type, or industry structure, for such research.241 It requires that, to fall within
the safe harbor for security testing, a researcher must perform her activities
with the authorization of the owner or operator of the system or network.242
Thus, the DMCA protects research where the investigator operates under
contract with the software vendor or cloud-computing system operator, but
leaves independent researchers vulnerable. This type of research is carried out
by corporate security firms such as Verisign iDefense Labs, Defensive
Thinking, or Symantec. Individual researchers or smaller companies may have
trouble obtaining authorization due to negotiation costs or because software
firms simply may not trust them.
To change the DMCA to more broadly protect the activity of security
research, rather than simply one organizational form of it, Congress should
either amend the relevant statutory subsection, or simply treat the DMCA
under a more generalized shield law. To carry out piecemeal reform, the
DMCA should focus on the activity of the security researcher, not on purpose
or on authorization. (Ironically, the current statutory exemption implicitly
recognizes the key role of the distribution of vulnerability information—it
conditions the safe harbor in part on whether the researcher shares the data

237 Anticircumvention Rulemaking, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/1201 (last updated
Feb. 7, 2011).
238 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4) (2010).
239 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,833 (July 27, 2010) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40).
240 See id. at 43,832–33 (documenting arguments of opponents to video game security exemption).
241 See generally Cross, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that vital security tools, such as Nmap, NetCat, and
OllyDbg, were developed by independent researchers).
242 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1) (2006).
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directly with the computer system owner or software developer.)243 In
particular, we suggest removing the requirement of obtaining authorization
from the owner of the computer, system, or network. Overall, though, we
believe that more comprehensive reform, which treats the DMCA as one
aspect of IP problems facing security researchers, is preferable.
The DMCA illustrates the potency of intellectual property threats to
security research by showing how dissemination of information can be chilled
even without filing suit. This Part has demonstrated the tools available to
software vendors to muzzle researchers. The next Part describes how to
mitigate this problem.
III. CREATING THE AEGIS
To protect researchers’ valuable contributions to software security, and to
ensure that vulnerability information remains in legitimate channels rather than
being sold on the black market, we propose three changes: one legal, one in
social norms, and one market-based.
A. Legal Reform
Our proposed legal reform seeks to shape researchers’ behavior by
conditioning a grant of immunity from IP suits on adherence to rules of
conduct. Providing a safe harbor from liability strongly encourages those at
risk to act in ways that remain within the exemption. For example, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act provides a safe harbor for service providers who,
upon notice from a copyright holder, disable access to or remove allegedly
infringing content.244 Most large providers, as a matter of course, remove
content upon notification without inquiring into the merits of the alleged
infringement claim or into their potential risk exposure.245 While this approach

243 See id. § 1201(j)(3) (stating that one factor to determine whether one qualifies for the exemption is
“whether the information derived from the security testing was . . . shared directly with the developer of such
computer, computer system, or computer network”).
244 Id. § 512(c).
245 See, e.g., Michael Piatek et al., Challenges and Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing
Networks—or—Why My Printer Received a DMCA Takedown Notice, 3 USENIX WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS
SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.usenix.org/event/hotsec08/tech/full_papers/piatek/piatek.pdf;
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006).
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has generated controversy, it is more certain and less expensive to stay within
the safe harbor.246
Similarly, if software security researchers can avail themselves of
immunity from IP infringement claims by acting in certain ways, it is likely
they will conform their behavior to those requirements. Many researchers
have limited resources and legal acumen, making them risk-averse regarding
litigation and thus more likely to track the exemption’s mandates. Legal
threats unquestionably influence researchers’ actions, as they learn from prior
controversies. For example, a trio of security experts demonstrated how to
hack smartcard-based electronic parking meters at the Black Hat security
conference in August 2009.247 The researchers deliberately chose to contact
neither the vendor nor the owner of the meters they hacked, and asked
reporters not to do so, citing the injunction entered against MIT researchers
who showed how to obtain free rides on Boston’s subway system in 2008.248
Hackers learn the relevant law quickly.
Crafting the requirements for immunity is critical in two respects. First,
conditions for the exemption will strongly influence how hackers behave—
what they do while testing code, and what they do with the resulting
information.249 Second, the safe harbor would deprive software vendors of
potent legal tools and remedies. If it immunizes undesirable behavior, it will
inflict harm on software firms, and on society generally.
Proper behavior for researchers is admittedly a contested issue within the
software security community.250 Proposals vary from advocating full
disclosure251 (publishing vulnerability details immediately upon discovery) to
246 See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Law Professor Wendy Seltzer Takes on the NFL, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar.
21, 2007, 12:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/03/21/law-professor-wendy-seltzer-takes-on-the-nfl/tab/
article.
247 Joe Grand et al., “Smart” Parking Meter Implementations, Globalism, and You (2009) (PowerPoint
presentation),
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/GRAND/BHUSA09-Grand-ParkingMeterSLIDES.pdf.
248 Kim Zetter, Smart Parking Meters Hacked—Free Parking for All!, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (July 30,
2009, 4:51 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/parking-meters.
249 The proposed legal reform can therefore be seen as attempting to specify best practices for security
research. We are grateful to Michael J. Madison for this insight; he develops a similar idea for the fair use
doctrine under copyright law in Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
250 See generally VIEGA, supra note 38, at 153–62.
251 Bruce Schneier, Debating Full Disclosure, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2007, 6:45 AM),
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/debating_full_d.html (“Public scrutiny is the only reliable
way to improve security . . . .”).
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revealing bug data only to vendors.252 Heated debate is common253 and
occasionally bleeds into active protests such as website hacking.254 The
normative position we adopt, responsible disclosure, represents a middle
ground that has won considerable support.255 Responsible disclosure requires
researchers to notify vendors first on discovering vulnerabilities, but preserves
the possibility of public dissemination to prod software firms to remediate
flaws.256 We believe that the potential for full public disclosure under our
proposal motivates vendors to issue patches and to press customers to install
those fixes, while the prohibition on selling vulnerability data to third parties
reduces the number of potential attackers until the vulnerability can be
remedied.257
The Hacker’s Aegis would set a default presumption that security
researchers are acting lawfully, and would require plaintiffs (such as aggrieved
software companies) to demonstrate that accused activity falls outside its
protections. In return for immunity from civil intellectual property claims,
software security researchers would be required to adhere to five rules: tell the
vendor first, don’t sell the bug, test on your own system, don’t weaponize, and
create a trail.

252 The Anti-Sec Movement, for example, opposes full disclosure “for the purpose of making it harder for
the security industry to exploit its consequences.” See ImageShack—Pwned for Anti-Sec, SECLISTS.ORG (July
11, 2009, 5:15 AM), http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Jul/95.
253 See, e.g., Marcus J. Ranum, The Vulnerability Disclosure Game: Are We More Secure?, CSO ONLINE
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.csoonline.com/article/440110/The_Vulnerability_Disclosure_Game_Are_We_
More_Secure_?CID=28073; Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a ‘Damned
Good Idea,’ CSO ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.csoonline.com/article/216205/schneier-full-disclosure-ofsecurity-vulnerabilities-a-damned-good-idea-.
254 See, e.g., John Leyden, ImageShack Hacked in Oddball Security Protest, REGISTER (July 13, 2009),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/13/imageshack_hack (describing defacement of ImageShack site by
Anti-Sec, a group protesting full disclosure).
255 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SHEPHERD, SANS INST., VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: HOW DO WE DEFINE
RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE? (2003), available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/threats/
how_do_we_define_responsible_disclosure_932?show=932.php&cat=threats; Chris Evans et al., Rebooting
Responsible Disclosure: A Focus on Protecting End Users, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (July 20, 2010,
2:07 PM), http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclosure-focus.html;
Vulnerability Disclosure Publications and Discussion Tracking, OULU UNIV. SECURE PROGRAMMING GRP.,
https://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/Disclosure_tracking (last visited May 13, 2011) (tracking debate).
However, Google has recently shifted its stance, albeit slightly, focusing on reasonable disclosure deadlines
rather than responsible disclosure. See Google Security and Product Safety, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
corporate/security.html (last visited May 13, 2011).
256 See, e.g., Steve Christey & Chris Wysopal, Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure Process (Feb. 2002)
(unpublished internet draft), http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/txt/ietf-draft.txt.
257 But see Brad Spengler, Hyenas of the Security Industry, SECLISTS.ORG (June 18, 2010, 1:19 AM),
http://seclists.org/dailydave/2010/q2/58 (criticizing responsible disclosure and vendor lag in patching bugs).
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1. Tell the Vendor First
The first conduct-based rule would require a researcher who discovers a
security vulnerability to report it to the vendor of the affected software before
publishing any information about the flaw. Failure to report before disclosing
information about the bug would bar the researcher from availing herself of the
safe harbor, but should not function as evidence of infringement or any other
legal liability. Hackers should tell the software producer—the party best
positioned to remedy the flaw—first.
The reporting requirement includes two additional components. The first
would mandate that researchers use the method of contact described on the
home page of a vendor’s site; if the vendor fails to include a contact
mechanism on their site, the researcher may simply notify customer support or
the firm’s general counsel.258 Bugs submitted to tech support or to a
company’s lawyer are less likely to receive attention, which is why this
approach seeks to press vendors to establish a means of gathering vulnerability
data. Companies would likely opt to create such mechanisms because failure
to do so would let researchers potentially avail themselves of the safe harbor
merely by contacting technical support. Support representatives may not be
trained to deal properly with security reports, and hence firms would lose legal
recourse without much corresponding benefit. Researchers would use the
designated contact path because immunity depends upon it. Moreover, hackers
want bugs to be taken seriously, and sending findings into proper channels
increases the likelihood that that will occur. A contact system modeled on the
designated agent to receive notifications of claimed copyright infringement
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act would be optimal.259 The DMCA
confers immunity upon online service providers who make available on their
websites contact information for this agent; copyright owners are increasingly
accustomed to looking on a service provider’s home page for contact details.260
The contact mechanism would reduce search and communication costs for
both parties.
The second component would mandate a postreporting delay before the
researcher could share vulnerability data publicly. This would provide time for
258

See, e.g., Bug Reporting, APPLE DEVELOPER, http://developer.apple.com/bugreporter (last visited May
13, 2011); Report a Microsoft Product Bug, MICROSOFT SUPPORT, http://support.microsoft.com/gp/contactbug
(last updated July 30, 2009).
259 See Service Provider Agents, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/a_
agents.html (last visited May 13, 2011).
260 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2006).
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the vendor to assess the new information, contact the researcher, and begin
work upon a patch if necessary.261 Public disclosure before this period would
negate the safe harbor. After the initial waiting period passes, the researcher
would be free to share the vulnerability data.262 Researchers interested in
blackmail are unlikely to follow the safe harbor’s rules in any case, and public
disclosure is an important incentive to compel vendors to take bugs seriously.
Trusted intermediaries, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team
Communication Center (CERT/CC), disclose vulnerabilities publicly forty-five
days after they are initially reported, regardless of the status of patches from
vendors.263 The term of the delay period must balance providing vendors with
sufficient time to patch, against the risk to users from unpatched vulnerabilities
and the need to press software manufacturers to act promptly. This is
ultimately an empirical question, but we believe the CERT/CC forty-five-day
model is a useful starting point—particularly since vendors and the security
community are already accustomed to it.
2. Do Not Sell the Bug
The second behavior rule would ban sales of vulnerability data to third
parties. Researchers would forfeit the safe harbor if there were sufficient
credible evidence that they offered data about the vulnerability to any third
party for compensation. (This would permit transactions with the vendor.) By
“sufficient credible evidence,” we mean concrete facts, and not conclusory
allegations or statements on information and belief by vendors. To defeat
immunity based on this factor, a software provider would have to adduce and
support facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.264 While this might
seem to impair programs such as Tipping Point’s Zero Day Initiative, where
independent firms pay researchers for reporting security bugs to them, this
concern is readily mitigated via private law.265 If participating in third-party
“bounty hunter” programs makes a researcher ineligible for the public law safe
harbor, researchers will either demand that their agreements with these

261 See generally Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, MICROSOFT SECURITY RESPONSE CENTER,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/msrc/report/disclosure.aspx (last visited May 13, 2011).
262 See generally VIEGA, supra note 38, at 153–62.
263 CERT/CC Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert.
org/kb/vul_disclosure.html (last updated May 15, 2008).
264 The weight of evidence required to overcome a motion to dismiss is unclear after the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). We do not believe that these shifts in the standard will have a material effect on the safe harbor.
265 See ZERO DAY INITIATIVE, http://www.zerodayinitiative.com (last visited May 13, 2011).
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programs indemnify them against legal risks from IP suits, thus effectively
reproducing the immunity, or the price that they require for reporting bugs will
increase to compensate them for the risk.266 The goal of this factor is to
discourage researchers from engaging in strategic behavior by marketing their
wares to the underground before, or concurrently with, offering them to
vendors. While proof of efforts to sell vulnerability data may be difficult to
obtain, we believe that the existence of this factor will help to discourage gray
hat hackers—those willing to act as black hats or white hats depending on
circumstances—from selling their findings to anyone other than the vendor.
3. Test on Your Own System
Third, researchers must test for vulnerabilities on their own systems unless
they cannot reasonably do so, as with cloud computing. A researcher would
lose the safe harbor on a showing of sufficient credible evidence that she
tested, or employed the flaw to compromise security on, a system not under her
lawful control, unless there was no reasonable alternative. This factor is
intended to push researchers to investigate vulnerabilities on test systems
rather than on production code that is in use by others.267 Analysis of whether
there is a reasonable alternative should be searching; hackers should not
interfere with others’ systems lightly. For example, if a software company
employs only open source code,268 or makes trial versions of its products
available,269 a researcher would have ready access to the relevant code. Hence,
the researcher would have to test on her own system to stay within the safe
harbor.
However, the rise of web services and cloud computing complicates this
analysis. In cases where the software is available only from third-party
systems, such as with Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2),270 researchers
should be permitted to test vulnerabilities hosted on those systems as long as
the researcher does not use the system to do more than verify the existence and
extent of the vulnerability, and does not cause more than temporary, minor
266 Cf. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
313, 351 n.165 (1990) (discussing ex ante risk compensation in tort).
267 See, e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.
com/ec2 (last visited May 13, 2011); Virtualization Security Tops RSA 2010 Innovation Sandbox, WIKIBON
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010), http://wikibon.org/blog/virtualization-security-tops-rsa-2010-innovation-sandbox.
268 See, e.g., Chromium, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/chromium (last visited May 13, 2011).
269 See, e.g., Free Trial Software, MCAFEE, http://home.mcafee.com/Store/FreeTrial.aspx (last visited
May 13, 2011). This might also helpfully push vendors to make versions available for testing.
270 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), supra note 267.
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disruption to the operation of the service. While this qualification makes this
third factor closer to a standard than a rule for cloud computing, it is necessary
to enable research on “software as a service” applications and to protect
researchers against claims that their testing harmed or impeded the service.271
4. Do Not Weaponize
Fourth, the researcher must not publish, without the vendor’s authorization,
exploit- or proof-of-concept code that enables attacks against the vulnerability.
Researchers who “weaponize” vulnerabilities increase the number of potential
attackers. Descriptions of security flaws may allow sophisticated black hats to
create programs that leverage bugs, but tools that automatically attack
weaknesses allow any user who downloads them to wreak havoc.272 While
exploit code may alert system administrators to methods of protecting against
vulnerabilities, the risk of attacks from “script kiddies” outweighs the gain in
safety.273 If a vendor can show sufficient credible evidence that the researcher
has published weaponized code, the researcher would forfeit immunity.
5. Create a Trail
Finally, the researcher must create an audit trail for the vulnerability by
reporting it to the clearinghouse described below in section D. To qualify for
the safe harbor, the discoverer of a bug must upload a detailed description of
the flaw, information on how to reproduce it, any known exploits or proof-ofconcept code, her identifying information, and a copy of any correspondence
(such as e-mail) with the vendor. This provides proof that a researcher found
and elucidated a bug, and that she provided the vendor with sufficient
information to investigate it. Moreover, mandating that researchers supply
contact information enables vendors to communicate with them, and also
deters strategic behavior, such as claiming credit for others’ discoveries.
The safe harbor for researchers who follow these five rules should be
structured as an exemption from liability and not merely as a defense. The
271 See Christina Torode, Cost-Effective Web Application Security Testing Options Take SaaS Form,
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://searchcio-midmarket.techtarget.com/tip/
SEARCHCIO-MIDMARKET.COM
0,289483,sid183_gci1377140,00.html. On standards versus rules in security, see Derek E. Bambauer, Rules,
Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49 (2010).
272 See Courtlend Little, Weaponization Trumps Skill, SC MAG. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.
scmagazineus.com/weaponization-trumps-skill/article/115432.
273 See generally Andy Greenberg, The No-Tech Hacker, FORBES.COM (Feb. 29, 2008, 6:00 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/2008/02/28/long-hacker-csc-tech-security-cx_ag_0229hacker.html.
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difference between an exemption and a defense can be seen by comparing
copyright’s fair use defense to the exemption from liability for third-party
speech under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.274 Fair use’s burden
falls upon the defendant; the plaintiff need not prove that the alleged
infringement was unfair.275 By contrast, a plaintiff alleging, for example, that
a website is responsible for comments posted by third-party users must show
that the site falls outside the exemption from liability created by § 230.276 An
exemption is preferable for three reasons. First, the safe harbor is most
relevant, and important, in the initial stages of a dispute between a researcher
and a vendor. Few IP lawsuits against hackers go to trial. Mike Lynn settled
with Cisco,277 as Griffith and Hoffman did with Blackboard.278 The goal of a
suit is not to win in court, but to prevent publication or use of vulnerability
data by the researcher, to gain time for the vendor to respond to the bug (both
in creating patches and in managing public perception of its product), and to
force the researcher to agree to terms favorable to the company in settling the
dispute. The first stage of the fight is typically a request for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction that constrains the hacker’s options
and conduct.279 Often, requests for such an order are handled ex parte, as with
Mike Lynn and Billy Hoffman. Thus, whether the researcher has an applicable
defense is irrelevant, unless it is sufficiently strong to affect the judge’s
perception of whether the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its claim.280
(This is unlikely, given that the vendor controls what evidence and arguments
are adduced in the initial hearing.) Once the vendor has the order, the
researcher must move to change the status quo.
Second, structuring the safe harbor as a defense would likely not reduce the
costs researchers face sufficiently. Hackers would have to muster evidence

274

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (“It [was] uncontested here
that [defendant’s] song would be an infringement of [plaintiff’s] rights in [the copyrighted work] under the
Copyright Act of 1976, but for a finding of fair use . . . .” (citation omitted)).
276 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no liability). But see Fair
Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding liability
where site’s design made it partially responsible for content).
277 Brian Krebs, Text of the Cisco-ISS-Lynn-Black Hat Agreement, WASH. POST SECURITY FIX (July 29,
2005, 12:35 PM), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/text_of_the_ciscoisslynnblack.html.
278 Blackboard Reaches Settlement with Hacker Duo, RFIDNEWS (July 16, 2003), http://www.rfidnews.
org/2003/07/16/blackboard-reaches-settlement-with-hacker-duo.
279 See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 157.
280 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citing standard for
preliminary injunction).
275
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and legal arguments to support their eligibility for the exemption.281 Even
hiring counsel can be an expensive proposition for individual researchers.
Finally, altering the allocation of the burden of proof is important to this
Article’s larger normative goals. Given its social utility, security research
should be presumptively legitimate, not unlawful. It should be incumbent
upon an aggrieved vendor to overcome this presumption of legality, not for
researchers to validate their activities.
Thus, the legal reform component of the Hacker’s Aegis would establish
exemption from IP-based liability for researchers who follow five rules: alert
the vendor first; do not offer to sell data to any third party; refrain from testing
systems not under their control unless there is no reasonable alternative; do not
weaponize code; and create an audit trail. To break through this exemption,
vendors would have to show facts that demonstrate that the researcher has
violated one of these five requirements.
B. Form for Substance
Legal reform to shield security researchers from the threat of IP litigation
by vendors could follow one of two paths. The first initiates new legislation to
exempt research from liability. The second adapts existing doctrinal defenses
in IP to cover researchers’ activities. Each approach confers benefits, and
faces challenges. Overall, we believe research-specific legislation is the
preferable path.
A statute conferring immunity upon a designated class of actors—security
researchers—has several advantages.282 First, legislation could tailor the
exemption to reward helpful behavior while leaving malefactors at risk of
liability. Second, actor-specific rules could eliminate strategic behavior by
vendors and others alleging infringement. If protections for researchers varied
by IP doctrine, aggrieved software companies would seek to frame their claims
under the theory with the narrowest protection.283 This is particularly
applicable for software, which can be protected under multiple, overlapping IP
regimes. Third, it likely operates more rapidly than an accretion of doctrine281

Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“Since fair use is an affirmative
defense [to a claim of copyright infringement], its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
282 See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
283 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 183 (adducing multiple IP theories for liability); Verified Complaint,
supra note 157.
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specific exemptions developed from individual cases. A specific law that
operated uniformly across IP doctrines and across jurisdictions would provide
a more complete and more rapid shield than case-by-case development.
However, employing a statute specific to vulnerability research also has
weaknesses. Most importantly, public choice problems make it likely that such
a law would be underprotective.284 Owners of intellectual property in software
are concentrated and relatively powerful.285 They have strong financial
incentives to maximize IP protection for their code and would likely oppose, or
seek to weaken, a research exemption. Other powerful interests—for example,
those whose content is protected by code, such as the movie industry—would
likely side with vendors.286 By contrast, independent researchers tend to be
individuals or small firms with less political sophistication and fewer
resources. The situation is analogous to the ecosystem of interests involved in
crafting copyright legislation described by Jessica Litman: content owners are
politically sophisticated, resourceful, and have significant stakes in the
outcome, while users and public interests are weaker, dispersed, and lack an
effective representative.287 A law protecting vulnerability research might
appear (if at all) like the exemptions under the DMCA for security research,
encryption research, and reverse engineering, which are so narrow that they
have only been advanced in five cases since 1998, and never successfully.288
Moreover, weak protection might be worse for researchers than none at all, as
it would be difficult to argue that their actions should be protected if they fell
outside the scope of legislatively determined permissible behavior.
The other option—employing doctrine-specific exceptions to protect
security research—also confers benefits. It has the standard virtues of
common law adjudication: judges can adapt protections to fit different
circumstances, and variation among courts permits helpful experimentation in

284

See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 403–04, 416.
See generally William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership
of Ideas in the United States, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 72, 82–84 (David Vaver ed., 2006).
286 See, e.g., Content Protection, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/contentprotection
(last visited May 13, 2011).
287 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
288 The reverse engineering exemption, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f), was held inapplicable in three cases:
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v.
Divineo, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). It was
treated favorably in dicta in one case, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d
522 (6th Cir. 2004). The encryption research exemption was held inapplicable in Reimerdes.
285
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the scope of protection.289 Exceptions such as fair use in copyright law have a
rich precedential history that could guide judges in tailoring protection
appropriately.290
Doctrine-specific rules also suffer drawbacks, though. First, protection for
software research would need to measure eligibility in a purposive fashion
rather than based on formal characteristics or descriptions of activity. Black
hat and white hat hackers perform the same type of research; until they
disseminate their findings, only their goals differ.291 If it is not clear what a
researcher plans to do with vulnerability information, a court may be riskaverse and block dissemination.292
Second, judges—especially those
unfamiliar with computer technology—may be skeptical of the value of
independent security research (rather than that conducted by a vendor), and
will likely suffer from information asymmetry, particularly when confronted
with ex parte requests for temporary injunctive relief. A vendor’s portrayal of
the risks from a rogue teenage hacker may swamp calculations of the greater
public interest in salience.293 Finally, vendors would likely engage in strategic
behavior. Many complaints against researchers allege multiple violations from
different IP doctrines: Mike Lynn faced claims for copyright infringement and
misappropriation of trade secrets; Billy Hoffman and Virgil Griffith were
accused of trade secret and trademark violations.294 If protections for security
research varied by doctrine, software firms would simply recast their claims
against hackers in the relevant theory with the least protection. A shield with
holes is nearly as ineffective as no shield at all.
Overall, a statute specifically protecting software security research
comports best with this Article’s goals. It would focus on the activity to be
protected, and not on the form in which a vendor’s threat appears. Similarly, a
shield law would protect researchers across jurisdictions, as well as across
areas of IP. Lastly, a specific statute may be cost saving: it guides courts on

289 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); ROSCOE
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
290 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
291 See Bryan Smith et al., Ethical Hacking: The Security Justification, in ETHICS AND ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION 148 (Barbara Rockenbach & Tom Mendina eds., 2003).
292 Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 193, 199–203 (1991).
293 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 692–94 (2006); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 65, at 24–26, 33–34.
294 Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6–7.
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how to evaluate researchers’ actions, and notifies researchers about how to
avoid liability. While a shield law faces political challenges, we prefer it as a
more effective solution.
C. Changing the Hacker Image
It’s so easy to impress judges with heavily connoted words like
“virus”, “pirate”, “terrorist”, “hacker”, and it’s so difficult on the
other hand to explain the scientific method and the deep curiosity
295
that makes us analyze how software works and find their flaws.

The term hacker is a loaded one. It connotes not only technical skill, but
also a disregard for rules and, at times, a malicious enjoyment in finding flaws
and wreaking havoc.296 Researchers like being seen as outlaws rather than
nerds. However, these normative associations have real drawbacks along with
psychological benefits.297 Judges, journalists, and the general public may
perceive a “hacker” as inherently threatening, and react accordingly.298 We
propose that the research community attempt to mitigate this semantic
problem.
Hackers suffer an inherent disadvantage in how others are likely to
perceive their work, in three ways. First, an aggrieved software vendor
possesses first-mover advantage: the firm is generally the party that frames the
dispute for a court by filing a complaint or a request for temporary injunctive
relief, which often occurs ex parte. Second, plaintiffs may mix allegations of
criminal liability with IP claims, portraying the hackers as vandals or
thieves.299 Finally, intellectual property itself is a normatively loaded term that
confers an advantage on software providers: researchers are seen as meddling,
interfering with, or damaging someone else’s valuable possession.300
While the first two of these challenges are hard to remedy, researchers can
shift the rhetorical debate surrounding their use of others’ IP. Even real
295 Rik Lambers, Guillermito: Reverse Engineering & Scientific Research, COCO (Jan. 11, 2005),
http://constitutionalcode.blogspot.com/2005/01/guillermito-reverse-engineering.html
(quoting
Guillame
Tena’s discussion of his trial for copyright infringement in France for publishing research on flaws in Tegam’s
Viguard antivirus software; Tegam labeled Tena a “terrorist”).
296 See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 51.
297 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (describing the
power of linguistic framing to affect cognitive perception).
298 See DOUGLAS THOMAS, HACKER CULTURE 5 (2002) (“This is the common perception of today’s
hacker—a wily computer criminal . . . .”).
299 See, e.g., supra notes 163, 202, 213, and accompanying text.
300 See Fisher, supra note 285, at 84–86.
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property doctrine permits unauthorized use when there is a compelling
reason,301 such as: necessity302 or emergency,303 countervailing social need
(such as access to social services),304 or even customary practice.305 And
intellectual property is most commonly viewed in the United States as a
utilitarian bargain between creators and the public, where the state confers
limited monopoly rights to attain social benefits, such as information
production and distribution.306 Those rights are circumscribed by exceptions,
such as the nominative use doctrine307 or privileges for socially beneficial
actors, such as public libraries,308 that safeguard valuable though
nonpermissive uses.309 Researchers should therefore emphasize not the
potential harm to software companies from vulnerabilities, but the benefits to
consumers from fixing those bugs (or, put another way, the risks to consumers
if a vendor fails to do so). Property law operates most strongly to limit
owners’ rights when there are significant externalities involved. Software is a
canonical example. To use a real property analogy: researchers should
emphasize the interests of the tenants (users) to counteract the claims of the
owners. By portraying their work as aligned with users’ needs, hackers can
mitigate the power of the property analogy employed by software vendors.
Shifting perceptions is difficult. If security researchers want to alter their
public image, two strategies are possible. First, they could seek to reclaim the
term hacker. Initially, a hacker was someone who probed or modified
hardware or software to see how it worked, and perhaps to change its
function.310 However, the term increasingly connotes one whose activities are
illegal, and perhaps malicious (though discerning researchers refer to the latter
as “crackers”).311 To return hacker to its lexical roots requires three things, in
301 See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J.
275 (2008).
302 See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).
303 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
304 See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971).
305 See, e.g., M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818) (recognizing right of hunters to
enter unenclosed rural land).
306 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1204–
26 (1996).
307 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing nominative use).
308 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
309 See, e.g., id. §§ 110, 117.
310 See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 5–26.
311 See id. at 231–50.
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ascending order of difficulty: finding a new term for those who invade systems
or crack software with ill intent; convincing the security research community
to adopt the new term and employ it with some consistency; and convincing
others (particularly the media) to follow the new usage pattern. Alternative
terms, such as cracker, are readily available. However, the research
community seems unwilling to shift usage—in part because some like the
outlaw image that hacker currently provides. Even if vulnerability researchers
take up new terms, it is not clear that such a change will spread to the wider
public, particularly since hacker is evocative.
The second option is for legitimate researchers to abandon hacker to the
black hats. One way to do this would be to embed the term hacker in federal
criminal law, such as by defining it in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.312
This would formalize the equivalence between hackers and black hats.
Legitimate researchers would employ a new term to describe those who
conform to laws and norms governing software security, and would insist (to
the degree they are able) that others refer to them by that moniker. While the
adoption challenges described above remain, a new term will lack the
cognitive inertia that hacker possesses, which may mitigate these issues.
Moreover, researchers can seek to shift the analogy that dominates
vulnerability analysis. If they portray their role as similar to whistleblowers,313
independent testing companies such as Consumers Union,314 or watchdogs
such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest,315 their work is more
likely to be treated as legitimate. The term needs to be pithy, appealing, and
different from hacker; we offer bug hunter, cyber-watchdog, and security
researcher as possibilities, but hope others will introduce more catchy
options.316 This shift in perception—drawing a distinct rhetorical line between
white hat and black hat researchers—will benefit researchers. As researchers’

312

We thank Scott Velez for this insight.
See, e.g., JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 3 (1998) (describing role of
Frederic Whitehurst in revealing wrongdoing at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime laboratory).
314 See, e.g., Cutting Surgical Infections, SAFE PATIENT PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.
safepatientproject.org/cutting_surgical_infection.pdf (documenting hospitals’ rates of infections during
surgery).
315 See, e.g., Bayer Ads Misleading Men About Prostate Cancer, Says CSPI, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB.
INTEREST (June 18, 2009), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200906181.html (summarizing a watchdog group’s
action to stop Bayer Healthcare’s false advertising).
316 We recognize our lack of skill in developing pithy terminology, and thank Shubha Ghosh (paladins),
Zahr Said (breakers), and Adam Candeub (vanguards) for excellent suggestions for the new moniker. Dan
Guido informed us that some researchers have adopted the term busticati for this purpose.
313
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work appears less threatening, legal measures to restrict its production and
dissemination will appear less necessary.
D. Freeing Markets
The market for information about software vulnerabilities is not a wellworking one due to high transaction costs, information asymmetry, the risks of
strategic behavior, and time pressure. We propose two changes that will
ameliorate these issues.
Both researchers and vendors are reluctant participants in transactions
involving vulnerability data, in part because of transaction costs. A hacker
who discovers a flaw must determine which party to attempt to do business
with (for example, deciding between the vendor, the vendor’s customers, or
security consulting firms) and then who to contact (for example, a
development team, legal counsel, or management). For their part, vendors
must separate legitimate inquiries from attempts at fraud or blackmail. They
also must assess whether a vulnerability is a known problem, whether the
researcher or others have working code to exploit it, and whether the seller is
sufficiently trustworthy to enter into a transaction.
Even once a willing seller locates, and communicates with, a willing buyer,
the parties will have difficulty coming to terms due to information
asymmetry.317 There is no price list, or set of criteria, to determine what a bug
is worth.318 Unsurprisingly, vendors tend to value vulnerability information
less than researchers do. The market for security flaws is an illiquid one, since
transactions are sporadic and often secret.319 The lack of reference data for
pricing means that vendors and researchers may fail to strike deals that would
benefit both parties, since they may err (or simply differ) in assessing the
data’s value. Moreover, reducing information asymmetry through sharing is
challenging.320 For sellers, presenting their wares to software companies is
chancy, not merely because doing so may put them at legal risk, but because

317

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 616 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Special Conference Ser.
13, 1962).
318 See Greenberg, supra note 101 (describing a researcher’s difficulty in valuing a server vulnerability,
even with a willing buyer).
319 See generally Karthik Kannan & Rahul Telang, Market for Software Vulnerabilities? Think Again, 51
MGMT. SCI. 726 (2005) (describing the inefficiencies of a market-based vulnerability-disclosure system).
320 See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 267 (1987).
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sharing findings could destroy their value. This results from Arrow’s paradox:
it is hard to demonstrate the value of a security flaw without revealing
information sufficient to permit the vendor to remedy it.321
Finally, the risk of strategic behavior weakens prospects for a successful
bargain. Researchers worry about misappropriation. Arrow’s paradox
presents a hard choice: disclose too little, and vendors may not believe the
problem is real; disclose too much, and a software company may take the
information without compensation.
Vendors, in turn, have trouble
guaranteeing that a researcher who shares data with them is not also sharing it
on the black market. Paying hackers for bugs may also tempt researchers to
target a company’s software. Fears about the other party’s behavior effectively
decrease the value of a deal for both sides (due to increased risk that the
bargain will unravel) and may lead to additional costs from preventive
measures.
Lastly, time pressures shrink the window for vendors and researchers to
reach an agreement. Hackers correctly perceive that their vulnerability
information has a limited viable lifetime.322 Other researchers may discover
the same weakness and either launch an attack or offer a competing bargain.
The vendor may change its code, deliberately or inadvertently remedying the
problem. If the hacker has revealed any information to the software company,
the firm may be able to reverse engineer the vulnerability from that limited
data, making the research worthless. Firms, too, face time constraints. If one
person has found a weakness in their code, others are likely to do so as well. A
researcher frustrated by the pace of negotiations may turn to the black market.
Finally, vendors require lead time to write, compile, test, and distribute
patches. To address a bug, a vendor needs as much time as possible to
generate a fix and to get customers to install it.
There are significant structural barriers to market transactions between
information suppliers (researchers) and consumers (vendors). To reduce these
impediments, we propose that a trusted third party act as a voluntary
coordinator or clearinghouse for vulnerability deals. We envision this
intermediary playing three roles. First, it would archive and validate
vulnerability data for researchers. This would allow a hacker to claim credit
321

Arrow, supra note 317, at 616.
Stefan Frei et al., Modelling the Security Ecosystem—The Dynamics of (In)Security, 8 WORKSHOP ON
ECON. INFO. SECURITY 3–7 (2009), available at http://www.techzoom.net/papers/weis_security_ecosystem_
2009.pdf.
322
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for discovering a bug, and to store diagnostic data and any exploit code.
Registries with trusted third parties have been used successfully to overcome
the challenges of Arrow’s paradox in other contexts, such as unsolicited
manuscripts for television shows and movies.323 Second, it would maintain
contact information for vendors and researchers. The third party might offer
anonymous referrals, where the identity of a hacker or vendor is known to the
coordinator but not to the other party. This could encourage researchers who
are risk-averse to share discoveries through legitimate channels. Finally, the
trusted third party could play a reputational role. It could make available data
about previous reports and transactions, perhaps in summary form, to help
vendors and researchers establish trustworthiness.324 A more interventionist
role might have the intermediary act as a third-party beneficiary to a
nondisclosure agreement between a seller and buyer, allowing the coordinator
to enforce bargains and to police adherence through both legal means and
reputational sanctions (such as disclosing violations publicly).
Existing security organizations, such as Computer Emergency Response
Team’s Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon University’s
Software Engineering Institute, are well positioned to act as clearinghouses.325
CERT/CC has a strong reputation in the computer security field and acts as a
key channel of information distribution about vulnerabilities.
CERT
Coordination Center partners with both private- and public-sector entities in
the field, and its Knowledgebase already contains data on thousands of
reported vulnerabilities.326 Other entities, such as the Internet Storm Center,327
MITRE,328 and perhaps even government-sponsored organizations such as the
National Vulnerability Database,329 might also act as intermediaries. The
critical issue for the coordinating entity is credibility: it must be trusted, both

323 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1366–68 (1996) (describing script registry operated by Writer’s
Guild of America); WGAWREGISTRY.ORG, http://www.wgawregistry.org/webrss (last visited May 13, 2011).
324 Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 93–97 (describing reputation rating
systems).
325 CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert.
org/certcc.html (last visited May 13, 2011).
326 CERT Knowledgebase, COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert.org/kb (last updated
Apr. 18, 2008).
327 About the Internet Storm Center, SANS INTERNET STORM CTR., http://isc.sans.org/about.html (last
visited May 13, 2011).
328 COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION, http://cwe.mitre.org (last updated May 11, 2011).
329 NAT’L VULNERABILITY DATABASE, http://nvd.nist.gov (last updated May 13, 2011).
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by vendors and by researchers.330 To this end, it might be necessary to insulate
the intermediary itself from liability based on holding bug data or interacting
with its constituents. The clearinghouse could likely achieve immunity
through private bargains—vendors and researchers could be required to waive
claims against it as a condition of participation—but if necessary, the “shield
law” discussed above should include such protections.
A benefit of this approach is that both vendors and researchers would likely
utilize a trusted third party system voluntarily, because it reduces their costs
and risks. For example, the combination of the registry and the reputational
metadata would help vendors decide which researchers are worth the cost of
entering into a nondisclosure agreement to further inspect a claimed
vulnerability. This increases the likelihood that this part of the Hacker’s Aegis
would be adopted, and used.
Use of a voluntary coordinating intermediary would help reduce costs that
researchers and vendors alike face in exchanging information about
vulnerabilities, making legitimate transactions easier and more likely.
E. Challenges
There are at least two potential challenges that our proposed reforms might
confront. The first is that our legal reforms might be underinclusive. The
second is the risk of strategic behavior based on the legal safe harbor we
propose. In this section, we address each issue.
Our legal proposal contemplates a shield from civil liability under
intellectual property claims or causes of action. However, it does not
encompass other theories of liability—in particular, tort claims, civil claims
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and criminal prosecution. We have
four reasons for crafting the safe harbor to leave these legal tools available.
First, in analyzing legal threats against security researchers, IP claims
predominate. We view establishing a shield against them as a first step, but
not necessarily a final one. If software companies shift to using alternative
theories such as tort and CFAA claims, with similar chilling effects, we would
advocate expanding the safe harbor to exclude such theories.

330 This could weigh against a government entity acting as intermediary, as security researchers may be
reluctant to reveal information to a sovereign with the power to prosecute them.
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Second, tort claims are typically weaker than IP ones. Common law
doctrines such as trespass to chattels have largely been displaced by softwareand internet-specific statutes.331 Successful suits under trespass to chattels are
relatively rare, and the theory has been questioned by leading courts such as
the California Supreme Court.332 Other tort claims, such as tortious
interference with business expectations or prospective economic advantage,
typically recapitulate IP claims in slightly different form.333 In addition, proof
of actual damage is required for tort claims, such as interference with
prospective advantage, and injunctive relief is atypical.334 These factors
reduce the risk from tort theories to software researchers.
Third, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act contains a built-in limitation on
civil liability that offers protection to security researchers. To maintain a cause
of action under the CFAA, a plaintiff must demonstrate economic damages of
at least $5,000 in a one-year period, impairment of a person’s medical
treatment, physical injury to a person, threat to public health or safety, or
damage to a U.S. government computer.335 A researcher testing software on a
computer under her control is unlikely to contravene any of these limits,
reducing the threat of the CFAA.
Finally, our proposed changes leave security researchers vulnerable to
criminal charges, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other
statutes.336 This is deliberate. We believe that criminal sanctions are
necessary to deter strategic behavior by black hat hackers, who may try to fit
their activities within the contours of the safe harbor.337 Criminal law acts to
reinforce any gaps within the liability shield.338 If a hacker’s activity, though
331 Compare CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (issuing
injunction against spammer based on trespass to chattels theory), with Facebook, Inc. v. Guerbuez, No. C0803889-JF-HRL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108921 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (issuing judgment in similar case
against spammer based on CAN-SPAM statute).
332 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
333 See, e.g., Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 323–24 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding claim preclusion of
trademark claim based on prior decision regarding interference with contractual relations).
334 See, e.g., Durasys, Inc. v. Leyba, 992 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1993).
335 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
336 See, e.g., id. §§ 1030, 2511.
337 But see, e.g., Mark Rasch, German Hacker-Tool Law Snares . . . No-One, REGISTER (June 7, 2009,
08:02 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/07/germany_hacker_tool_law (arguing German cybercrime
law resulted in security companies leaving that country, despite lack of prosecutions under it).
338 Cf. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2008)
(analyzing the effectiveness of neoclassical and alternative deterrence theories in the context of criminal,
corporate anti-fraud laws—an area in which perpetrators’ conduct is more likely to be discovered if they
discontinue the fraud).
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protected from civil claims, causes sufficient harm, a software company is
likely to be able to convince a prosecutor to file charges. The risk of
overdeterrence from criminal law remains, but it is likely no worse than under
current circumstances. In addition, prosecutors are more likely to arrive at an
objective assessment of whether a hacker’s behavior is beneficial or malicious
than the vendor whose software has been targeted. Thus, retaining criminal
liability for hacking serves a helpful deterrence function, and should not create
additional chilling effects for security researchers.
There is one aspect of CFAA criminal liability that may give hackers pause
and thereby create overdeterrence: the ban on damage that affects ten or more
computers.339 This provision, adopted to deal with threats from viruses and
worms, may be problematic when researchers probe cloud computing.
Services such as Gmail run on multiple servers, and their storage units (such as
storage array networks (SANs) or network-attached storage (NAS)) may
comprise computers in their own right.340 If criminal CFAA liability interferes
with testing of cloud-computing security, we propose two fixes. First, the legal
safe harbor could modify the CFAA to condition liability on accessing a larger
number of computers—perhaps 100. This would maintain liability for virus
creators and distributors, but would reduce the threat to researchers. Second—
and likely more promising—cloud-computing services should be treated as a
single computer under the CFAA. The appeal of cloud computing is that it
appears to users as a single service or computer. Moreover, the number of
computers accessed during a cloud-computing session is under the control of
the service provider. This creates a risk of strategic behavior: providers could
ensure that any transaction affected ten or more computers, creating the
possibility that any claimed damage would generate potential criminal liability.
However, we believe such alteration should be withheld until there is more
evidence of harm to cloud computing security research. As described above,
treating cloud computing as a single computer would effectively remove part
of the CFAA as a resource for providers, which is why we believe such a
change should wait for more evidence of a problem.
This Article’s proposals are a first step toward mitigating IP law’s
unhelpful channeling effects for software security research. Its proposed legal
339

18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI) (2006); id. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
Cf. SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INTRODUCTION TO CLOUD COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE (2009), available at
http://webobjects.cdw.com/webobjects/media/pdf/Sun_CloudComputing.pdf (discussing the transformative
nature of cloud computing and outlining considerations that businesses should take when implementing such a
system).
340
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reforms do not alter tort theories and civil CFAA claims regarding hacking
because their built-in doctrinal safeguards should be sufficient. Should this
prove incorrect, we propose revisiting the scope of the legal shield to address
such risks. And, our proposal retains criminal liability as a necessary deterrent
to counter strategic behavior by malicious hackers.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that intellectual property law impedes the dissemination
of socially valuable research into software security flaws. By reducing the
threat of civil IP liability for researchers, the cost of legitimate transactions,
and the specter of harm from the term hacker, our proposed reforms would
improve software security and decrease users’ risks.
The paper’s conclusions have repercussions beyond software—research
into security occurs in the physical world as well as the digital one.341 A
graduate student in computer science created a web application that generates a
boarding pass sufficiently realistic to deceive Transportation Security
Administration screeners.342 For his efforts to show the ineffectiveness of
airport security, he had his computer seized, was questioned by the FBI, and
was denounced by a U.S. Congressman.343 Cyclists who relied on Kryptonite
bike locks were startled when security consultant Chris Brennan showed how
to open the locks using a plastic pen.344 Medeco locks—considered so secure
that they are used at the White House and the Pentagon—have been hacked
using credit cards and sharp scissors.345 Security researcher Chris Soghoian
341 Cf. Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer
and Network Security?, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004) (contrasting free disclosure versus
secrecy and analyzing the ability of each to aid or diminish security in traditional contexts or in computer
network contexts).
342 CHRIS’S NWA BOARDING PASS GENERATOR, http://www.dubfire.net/boarding_pass (last visited May
13, 2011); see also Christopher Soghoian, Insecure Flight: Broken Boarding Passes and Ineffective Terrorist
Watch Lists (July 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1001675.
343 Robert Lemos, FBI Raids Home of Boarding-Pass Creator, SECURITYFOCUS (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/342; Jonathan Silverstein, Web Site Lets Anyone Create Fake Boarding
Passes, ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2611432&page=1; Ryan
Singel, Congressman Ed Markey Wants Security Researcher Arrested, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Oct. 27, 2006,
10:57 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2006/10/congressman_ed_/.
344 Leander Kahney, Twist a Pen, Open a Lock, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.wired.com/culture/
lifestyle/news/2004/09/64987; Filouphil, Kryptonite Bikeforum, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=-9bN0zfMFW4 (showing how to pick the lock in seconds).
345 Kim Zetter, Researchers Crack Medeco High-Security Locks with Plastic Keys, WIRED THREAT LEVEL
(Aug. 8, 2008, 11:19 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/medeco-locks-cr.
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published a guide to loopholes and exploits in consumer credit practices that
enable attackers to modify their credit reports and obtain loans for which they
could not otherwise qualify.346 “Locksporters” test every lock on the market
with tools from custom-made hooks to beer cans.347 Each of these activities
produces valuable information about how safe we really are, and each has been
subject to legal threats. It may be necessary to extend the Hacker’s Aegis to
protect them as well. Bug hunting may simply be one exemplar of a peerproduction activity with societal benefits that is impeded by law.
Software security research is helpful, and intellectual property law
interferes with it. This Article explains how to shield the white hats from the
gray suits.

346 Christopher Soghoian, Manipulation and Abuse of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies, FIRST
MONDAY (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2583/2246.
347 Charles Graeber, The Lock Busters, WIRED (Feb. 2005), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/
lockbusters.html; Trine Tsouderos, Pick a Lock. For fun. (It’s Legal Too), CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 2008, at
C1.

